Fugitive Operations and the Fourth Amendment: Representing Immigrants Arrested in Warrantless Home Raids by Treadwell, Nathan
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 89 | Number 2 Article 4
1-1-2011
Fugitive Operations and the Fourth Amendment:
Representing Immigrants Arrested in Warrantless
Home Raids
Nathan Treadwell
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina
Law Review by an authorized administrator of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Nathan Treadwell, Fugitive Operations and the Fourth Amendment: Representing Immigrants Arrested in Warrantless Home Raids, 89 N.C.
L. Rev. 507 (2011).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol89/iss2/4
FUGITIVE OPERATIONS AND THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT: REPRESENTING IMMIGRANTS
ARRESTED IN WARRANTLESS HOME RAIDS*
NATHAN TREADWELL*
In the past several years, United States Immigration and Customs
Enforcement ("ICE") has made warrantless home raids a key
component of interior immigration enforcement. Such raids, which
frequently bring in otherwise law-abiding undocumented
immigrants, violate the Fourth Amendment when they take place
without the consent of a member of the household. Press and
judicial accounts of such raids show that the agency now engages in
widespread unlawful entries as well as violent, demeaning, and
threatening conduct. This Article sets out a litigation theory for the
defense of undocumented immigrants arrested in warrantless raids.
The Article presents several viable but under-utilized grounds on
which immigrants subjected to ICE misconduct may seek the
suppression of illegally-acquired evidence and the dismissal of a
deportation proceeding.
First, notwithstanding the limited application of the exclusionary
rule in immigration proceedings, immigration courts follow an
exception articulated by the Supreme Court in INS v. Lopez-
Mendoza, allowing suppression of evidence obtained through
"egregious violations of the Fourth Amendment." Given that the
protection of the home is central to the history and purpose of the
Fourth Amendment, and given the heavy-handed and violent tactics
ICE uses in home raids, immigrants should argue that such raids
amount to egregious violations. Second, courts have a basis to
broaden the reach of the exclusionary rule in light of the Supreme
Court's suggestion in Lopez-Mendoza that widespread
constitutional violations by immigration authorities might justify
such a step. Third, immigrants may call for suppression for ICE
* @ 2011 Nathan Treadwell.
** J.D., 2009, City University of New York School of Law. I am particularly grateful to
Sameer Ashar, Jeff Kirchmeier, Aaron Amaral, Beena Ahmad, and Simon Moshenberg
for their helpful comments; to Ellen Friedland, Bitta Mostofi, Wilneida Negron, Anne
Pillsbury, Sid Harring, Peter Markowitz, Jaya Vasandani, Alizabeth Newman, and Liliana
Yanez; and to Rex Chen for his tireless and valuable support of practitioners working on
suppression issues. Finally, I would like to thank Elise Schuster for her love and support.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
violations of agency regulations, which mirror Fourth Amendment
and other protections. These litigation strategies could help re-
establish a credible deterrent to ICE's abusive conduct and could
provide immigration attorneys with a valuable tool for defending
undocumented victims of home raids.
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INTRODUCTION
Gladis Espitia, then six months pregnant, was home with visiting
relatives when agents surrounded her house.! Some of the officers
began to arrest her family members out on the lawn; others came to
the front door and began yelling, threatening to break it down or use
tear gas on the house.2 As Ms. Espitia's younger relatives hid in the
bathroom, agents broke open the front door.' They began to lead Ms.
Espitia and her family members out of the house,' threatening them
with handguns.' As Ms. Espitia tried to console a frightened family
member, an officer handcuffed her without asking who she was.6
Another yelled at Ms. Espitia to stop crying.! The police did not
1. First Amended Complaint at 17-19, Mancha v. Immigration & Customs
Enforcement, No. 1:06-cv-2650 (N.D. Ga. June 14, 2007), 2007 WL 4718224; Eugenia
Miranda, Redadas de Inmigraci6n en el Sureste de Georgia [Immigration Raids in
Southeast Georgia], ATLANTA LATINO, Sept. 7, 2006 (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review).
2. First Amended Complaint, supra note 1, at 17-18.
3. Id. at 18.
4. Id.
5. Miranda, supra note 1.
6. First Amended Complaint, supra note 1, at 18.
7. Id. at 16-18; Miranda, supra note 1.
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suspect Ms. Espitia of any crime and the officers produced no
warrant.'
Immigration courts often hear accounts like Ms. Espitia's of
home invasions, arbitrary arrests, threats of violence, and other
human rights abuses, usually in the context of a noncitizen seeking
asylum in light of persecution in her home country.9 Ms. Espitia's
home, though, is the United States: she is a citizen by birth, a resident
of Oak Park, Georgia.o Her loved ones, some of them citizens and
some noncitizens, were not rounded up by the security forces of a
faraway government; her home was raided, without a warrant, by
United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE")."
8. First Amended Complaint, supra note 1, at 19.
9. See, e.g., In re L-K-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 677 (B.I.A. 2004) (evaluating an asylum
application by a noncitizen injured during an invasion of her residence); In re O-Z- & I-Z-,
22 I. & N. Dec. 23, 25 (B.I.A. 1998) (evaluating an asylum application by noncitizens
harassed and threatened at their home). The nation's immigration courts-more than fifty
in number, under the Department of Justice's Executive Office for Immigration Review-
determine whether noncitizens may be removed from the United States. Office of the
Chief Immigration Judge, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE., http://www.justice.gov/eoir/ocijinfo.htm
(last visited Dec. 31, 2010). They conduct formal, adversarial proceedings in which the
government can put forth evidence of the noncitizen's removability (formerly called
"deportability"); noncitizens found removable may argue for various types of relief, such
as asylum. Id. For a broader discussion of the role of immigration courts and immigration
enforcement, see infra note 93 and accompanying text (arguing that immigration
proceedings, though nominally civil, have become analogous to criminal proceedings and
ought to incorporate some of the protections available in criminal proceedings).
10. First Amended Complaint, supra note 1, at 4.
11. Id. at 17-19. ICE is the agency charged with enforcing the nation's immigration
laws throughout the interior of the United States. BESS CHIU ET AL., CARDOZO
IMMIGRATION JUSTICE CLINIC, CONSTITUTION ON ICE: A REPORT ON IMMIGRATION
HOME RAID OPERATIONS 3 (2009) [hereinafter CARDOZO IMMIGRATION JUSTICE
CLINIC], available at http://www.cardozo.yu.edu/uploadedFiles/CardozolProfiles/
immigrationlaw-741/IJCICE-Home-Raid-Report%2OUpdated.pdf. Founded in 2003 as a
successor to the Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS"), ICE carries out its
mandate through a number of means, including investigations and arrests of individual
noncitizens suspected of violating civil immigration restrictions. Id. at 3. While a number
of programs within ICE make use of home raids, one-the National Fugitive Operations
Program-has attracted the most attention, thanks to its dramatic growth and
controversial methods. Id. at 5; MARGOT MENDELSON ET AL., MIGRATION POLICY INST.,
COLLATERAL DAMAGE: AN EXAMINATION OF ICE'S FUGITIVE OPERATIONS
PROGRAM 1 (2009) [hereinafter MIGRATION POLICY INST.], available at
www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/NFOP_-FebO9.pdf. This program fields seven-person
Fugitive Operations Teams ("FOTs"), nominally charged with locating "fugitive"
noncitizens subject to outstanding deportation orders, with a particular emphasis on those
posing a risk to the community or national security. CARDOZO IMMIGRATION JUSTICE
CLINIC, supra, at 5. As this Article will discuss, critics have charged that FOTs have largely
discarded this security focus, and that they instead raid homes in an effort to find and
arrest as many undocumented immigrants as possible-most of those arrested by FOTs do
not pose security threats, and most do not have a history of criminal convictions. Id. at 16-
17; MIGRATION POLICY INST., supra, at 1-2.
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Warrantless home raids have become a key element of
contemporary immigration enforcement, a source of thousands of
arrests and deportations for civil immigration violations.12 The
number of raids by ICE Fugitive Operations Teams ("FOTs") has
grown dramatically in recent years." Home raids have become
increasingly controversial; they are the subject of considerable public
and legislative anger for the disruptions they cause to immigrant
families and communities.14 They have come under judicial scrutiny as
well," since absent extenuating circumstances or the consent of
residents, warrantless home invasions are illegal, a violation of the
Fourth Amendment guarantee against unreasonable search and
seizure.16
ICE contends that its agents do not enter homes without first
obtaining the consent of a resident;" in contrast, immigrants and their
advocates have charged that agents routinely force their way in,
12. See MIGRATION POLICY INST., supra note 11, at 7 (noting that Fugitive
Operations raids are carried out without judicially issued warrants); Stella Burch Elias,
"Good Reason to Believe": Widespread Constitutional Violations in the Course of
Immigration Enforcement and the Case for Revisiting Lopez-Mendoza, 2008 Wis. L. REV.
1109, 1129 (2008) (discussing the expansion of "Fugitive Operations" raids).
13. See Elias, supra note 12, at 1129.
14. See, e.g., Broken Borders Need More than Lip Service, USA TODAY, June 27,
2008, at 19A (discussing a speech by Senator Robert Menendez decrying constitutional
rights violations in home raids); Will Oremus, P.A. Sends Message on Federal Raids,
Immigrants, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Oct. 23, 2008, at 3B (discussing a Palo Alto
resolution objecting to ICE violations of the rights of undocumented residents); Letter
from Senator Kirstin Gillibrand to Janet Napolitano, Sec'y of Homeland Sec. (Feb. 5,
2009), available at http://gillibrand.senate.gov/imo/medialdoclNapolitanoRaidsl.pdf
(demanding an end to warrantless home raids: "[t]hese types of practices are not only
inhumane, they are illegal"); Letter from Senator Joseph Lieberman et al. to Michael
Chertoff, Sec'y of Homeland Sec. (June 11, 2007), available at http://dodd.senate.gov/
?q=node/3936 (objecting to apparently warrantless home invasions in New Haven,
Connecticut); Letter from Thomas Suozzi, Nassau Cnty. Exec., to Michael Chertoff, Sec'y
of Homeland Sec. (Oct. 2, 2007), available at http://web.archive.org/web/20080114130103/
http://www.nassaucountyny.gov/agencies/countyexecutive/newsrelease/2007/10-2-2007
.html (calling for an investigation into practices during a series of home raids).
15. See, e.g., Lopez-Rodriguez v. Mukasey, 536 F.3d 1012 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding that
a warrantless, nonconsensual home invasion constitutes an egregious constitutional
violation so as to justify suppression of evidence thereby gathered).
16. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001) ("[W]ith few exceptions, the
question whether a warrantless search of a home is reasonable and hence constitutional
must be answered no."); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980) (holding that,
without consent to enter, exigent circumstances, or prior judicial authorization, the Fourth
Amendment prohibits entry to effect an arrest).
17. Letter from Michael Chertoff, Sec'y of Homeland Sec., to Senator Christopher
Dodd (June 14, 2007), available at http://www.nytimes.com/packages/htmllnyregion/
20070723Chertoff.pdf.
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sometimes threatening residents in the process.18 Other authors have
addressed the factual dispute over how frequently Fourth
Amendment violations occur in interior immigration enforcement."9
This Article will address what legal consequences should flow from a
Fourth Amendment violation if one is shown to underlie evidence
introduced in a proceeding to deport a noncitizen. This Article sets
out a litigation theory for the defense of undocumented immigrants
facing deportation after warrantless home raids-a theory that calls
for evidentiary suppression for constitutional and regulatory
violations.
After a summary of ICE's practices during home raids, Part I of
this Article will provide a brief overview of the Fourth Amendment's
protections,2 0 and will discuss limitations on the role those protections
play in the immigration courts.2 1 Part II will show that, under the
Fourth Amendment analysis applicable in the immigration courts,
home raids violate constitutional norms so severely that they justify
applying the exclusionary rule notwithstanding its limited role in
removal proceedings. Part III sets out an alternative ground for
evidentiary suppression following home raids, in light of the Supreme
Court's suggestion that it might consider broader application of the
exclusionary rule should constitutional violations by immigration
authorities become widespread. Finally, Part IV sets out yet another
ground for suppression, rooted in regulations safeguarding the rights
of those subject to ICE investigations.
Though the Supreme Court has weakened the utility of the
Fourth Amendment in preventing unlawful immigration enforcement
activities,22 suppression remains a valuable, if underutilized, tool for
protecting the rights of immigrants. Warrantless entry is a tactic at
sharp odds with American legal tradition; as such, it is uniquely
vulnerable to constitutional challenge.2 3 This work discusses many of
the questions, pitfalls, and possibilities that arise for advocates
18. See infra Part II.A.2.
19. See, e.g., CARDOZO IMMIGRATION JUSTICE CLINIC, supra note 11, at 16-22;
Elias, supra note 12, at 1147-48; Katherine Evans, The ICE Storm in U.S. Homes: An
Urgent Call for Policy Change, 33 N.Y.U. REv. L. & SOC. CHANGE 561, 566 (2009).
20. See infra Part I.B.
21. See infra Part I.C.
22. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1050 (1984) (holding that the exclusionary
rule does not apply in civil deportation proceedings). But see id. at 1050-51 (O'Connor, J.,
plurality opinion) (suggesting that the exclusionary rule might be appropriate for
"egregious" constitutional violations, or more generally should violations become
widespread).
23. See infra Part II.B.3.
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seeking evidentiary suppression in immigration proceedings.2 4 It was
written in the hope of encouraging more advocates to contest
violations of their clients' basic constitutional rights.
I. FUGITIVE OPERATIONS AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
A review of ICE's recent conduct during home raids, drawing on
mainstream news reports, agency records, judicial decisions, and
other public sources, shows that such raids frequently involve
nonconsensual warrantless entries and other rights violations. Before
setting out litigation approaches for challenging such misconduct, this
Article will present a brief overview of the law of search and seizure,
as well as the case law limiting its role in immigration proceedings.
A. Fugitive Operations
In a 2007 letter to members of the Connecticut delegation to the
United States Congress, Homeland Security Secretary Michael
Chertoff responded to criticisms of a New Haven enforcement
operation by describing the agency's conduct. "I want to emphasize
that it is not our policy for [Fugitive Operations Teams] to conduct
'raids,' or take an ad hoc approach to enforcing immigration law;
rather, the policy is to focus their efforts on specific fugitive aliens at
specific locations."' Prior to enforcement operations, ICE's Office of
Detention and Removal Operations issues administrative warrants of
removal; as Secretary Chertoff notes, "[a] warrant of removal is
administrative in nature and does not grant the same authority to
enter dwellings as a judicially approved search or arrest warrant." 26
On the day of the operation, officers approached the suspect's home
and asked for permission to enter: "At no time did any ICE FOTs
enter a dwelling without consent." 27 Agents asked how many other
occupants were present, and asked them "to come into a common
area for officer safety." 28 Secretary Chertoff suggested that agents
24. Suppression cases present a number of practical difficulties-for example, the
government may sometimes seek to establish alienage through evidence independent of
the alleged rights violations. A number of articles have addressed in more depth the
procedural complexities associated with motions to suppress. See, e.g., Maria T. Baldini-
Potermin et al., Motions to Suppress: Breathing New Life into the Exclusionary Rule in
Removal Proceedings, in 2008-2009 IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY LAW HANDBOOK
415, 420 (Richard J. Link ed., 2008).
25. Letter from Michael Chertoff to Senator Christopher Dodd, supra note 17, at 2.
26. Id. For a discussion of the legal distinction between an administrative warrant of
removal and a warrant that an impartial magistrate issues, see infra Part II.A.1.
27. Letter from Michael Chertoff to Senator Christopher Dodd, supra note 17, at 2.
28. Id.
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questioned others as to their immigration status, and arrested both
the principal identified in the warrant as well as any other occupants
believed to be out of status (that is, without a lawful immigration
status).29
Following that operation, New Haven Mayor John DeStefano,
Jr. painted a different picture while addressing a commission created
by labor unions and civil rights groups to investigate ICE practices.
Mayor DeStefano spoke of
ICE agents entering homes, removing mothers carrying their
babies out of their homes, removing some people from right out
of the shower and others who were sleeping in their beds. The
agents entered homes with guns drawn as if apprehending
wanted murderers rather than potential administrative
immigration law violators. And in all residences where ICE
entered the homes, "officers did not show any warrants before
entering" nor did they "request permission," but rather
"pushed their way in."30
Mayor DeStefano's allegations fit a pattern noted nationwide:
forced entries followed by roundups and interrogations of every
occupant in the home. In 2009, the Immigration Justice Clinic at the
Cardozo School of Law released a report on ICE home raid
operations, prepared under the guidance of an advisory panel of law
enforcement professionals.3 1 The first public study reviewing ICE
documentation to assess the prevalence of constitutional violations
during raids, Cardozo's report drew on hundreds of arrest records as
well as news accounts and litigation documents.32 The authors found
"a suspiciously uniform pattern of misconduct," beginning with
coerced entry:
There is story after story of ICE agents, armed with only an
administrative warrant, yelling and banging on doors and then
forcing their way into homes in the pre-dawn hours by pushing
their way in if residents unlock their doors, and otherwise
climbing through windows or kicking in doors. Some residents
report being awakened by the presence of armed ICE officers
29. Id. (noting that such questioning "does not constitute a Fourth Amendment
seizure," and that "[a] warrant is not necessary when arresting someone who is in the
country illegally").
30. NAT'L COMM'N ON ICE MISCONDUCT & VIOLATIONS OF 4TH AMENDMENT
RIGHTS, RAIDS ON WORKERS: DESTROYING OUR RIGHTS 49 (2009) (quoting Mayor
John DeStefano Jr., Boston Hearing).
31. CARDOZO IMMIGRATION JUSTICE CLINIC, supra note 11, at iii.
32. Id. at 9-10, 16.
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in their bedrooms who illegally gained entry through unlocked
doors.33
Gladis Espitia's story-her front door battered down by ICE
agents after they threatened to "gas" her house-is egregious but not
unique. Ms. Espitia's co-plaintiff, Ranulfo Perez, was standing outside
of his home when several agents parked on his yard and drew their
weapons; one agent held Mr. Perez at gunpoint and pressed him
against his truck for several minutes as other agents conducted a
warrantless sweep of the home.' After an ICE officer allowed Mr.
Perez to show his license and Social Security card, the agent released
him, telling him that, as ICE would be in the area for two weeks, Mr.
Perez and his family should leave so as to avoid future home
invasions.35
During a Milford, Massachusetts raid, eight to ten ICE agents
broke down a door, leaving behind shards from the door frame, and
entered with guns drawn. A witness said: "[T]hey told everyone to lie
down on the floor, they say [sic] not to move."" In March 2008,
agents in California told a resident that they would break his door
down after he asked them to produce a search warrant.37 That same
year, a House subcommittee heard testimony from Marie Justeen
Mancha, a teenage citizen from Georgia. Mancha was at home alone
when agents came in through her unlocked front door and demanded
information regarding her family's immigration status. Upon seeing
her, one agent kept his hand on his gun "as if he was ready to take it
out any minute."39
These allegations add up to more than isolated occurrences; they
reflect a nationwide pattern of forced entries. Recent suits alleging
illegal searches during home raids have been filed in Arizona,40
33. Id. at 16-17.
34. First Amended Complaint, supra note 1, at 11-12.
35. Id. at 12-13.
36. CARDOZO IMMIGRATION JUSTICE CLINIC, supra note 11, at 18 (quoting Aaron
Nicodemus, Illegal Aliens Arrested in Raid: Feds Nab 15 in Milford, TELEGRAM &
GAZETTE (Worcester, Mass.), Dec. 9, 2007, at B).
37. Id. at 17 (citing Sandra Hernandez, ICE Increases Use of Home Raids, DAILY J.
(L.A.), Mar. 26, 2008, at 1).
38. Problems with ICE Interrogation, Detention, and Removal Procedures: Hearing
Before the H. Subcomm. on Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border Sec., & Int'l Law,
110th Cong. 34-35 (2008) (testimony of Marie Justeen Mancha, Student, Tattnall County
High School).
39. CARDOZO IMMIGRATION JUSTICE CLINIC, supra note 11, at 21 (quoting First
Amended Complaint, supra note 1, at 9).
40. Solomon Moore, Raid Leads to Colleague, Then Lawsuit, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8,
2009, at A16.
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California," Connecticut,42 New Jersey,43 New Mexico," New York,45
and Tennessee.46 News reports have highlighted warrantless forced
entries in many other locales.47
Perhaps most damning, local officials who initially cooperated
with Fugitive Operations raids have accused ICE of forced entries.
Following operations in Nassau County, New York, in which 186
were arrested, Nassau County Police Commissioner Lawrence
Mulvey stated he could not continue working with ICE "in good
conscience."" ICE claimed "consent to enter" each of the ninety-six
homes targeted in the operation." Commissioner Mulvey responded:
"In my 29 years of police work, I have executed countless warrants
and have sought consent to enter countless homes. ICE's claim that
they received 100% compliance with their requests to enter is not
credible even under the best of circumstances.""o Secretary Chertoff's
contention-that ICE does not enter homes without consent-is
simply false.
While any law enforcement entry into the home is likely to seem
threatening to residents, the accounts of ICE enforcement operations
indicate that the agency uses excessive displays of force. The Fourth
41. Complaint at 1, Reyes v. Alcantar, No. 4:07-cv-02271-SBA (N.D. Cal. Apr. 26,
2007), 2007 WL 1511158.
42. Complaint at 1, Barrera v. Boughton, No. 3:07-cv-01436-RNC (D. Conn. Nov. 26,
2007), 2007 WL 4462095.
43. MIGRATION POLICY INST., supra note 11, at 24.
44. See Elias, supra note 12, at 1132.
45. Nina Bernstein, Immigration Raids Single Out Hispanics, Lawsuit Says, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 21, 2007, at B3.
46. Julia Preston, No Need for a Warrant, You're an Immigrant, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14,
2007, at C3.
47. See, e.g., Sandra Forester, Immigration Raids Spark Anger in Sun Valley Area,
IDAHO STATESMAN, Sept. 21, 2007, at 1 ("In some instances, federal agents rushed into
the house when a child opened the door."); Samuel G. Freedman, Immigration Raid
Leaves Sense of Dread in Hispanic Students, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2007, at B7 (reporting
warrantless entries, including one in which agents broke the window of a suspect's
apartment); Chao Xiong, Immigration Case of Willmar Boy, 10, Goes to Court, STAR
TRIB. (Minneapolis-St. Paul), Oct. 4, 2007, http://www.startribune.comlocal/11557981
.html (discussing occasion when agents "burst into" home, interrogating nine-year-old
child apart from parent); see also NAT'L NETWORK FOR IMMIGRANT & REFUGEE
RIGHTS, OVER-RAIDED, UNDER SIEGE 7-9 (2008) (citing examples of warrantless home
invasions).
48. Nina Bernstein, Raids Were a Shambles, Nassau Complains to U.S., N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 3, 2007, at Bl.
49. CARDOZO IMMIGRATION JUSTICE CLINIC, supra note 11, at 16 (citing an
Affidavit of Nassau County Police Commissioner Lawrence Mulvey).
50. Id.
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Amendment governs the use of force during arrests;"1 suffice it to say
that officers may not lightly threaten to use tear gas against a
suspect's home, hold an unarmed and cooperating person at gunpoint
against a car, or kick down a door with guns drawn.52 The New York
Times reported that in 2008, ICE agents used guns to threaten a nine-
year-old and his parents after entering while his mother was
showering." The same article cited an immigration judge's finding
that agents forced a resident to stand in a common area in his
underwear while they continued their warrantless search of his
house.54 ICE's forced entries are not merely technical violations of the
warrant requirement. They are sometimes violent, intrusive and
humiliating-in short, they offend the values underlying the Fourth
Amendment.
Home raids have grown far more frequent in recent years;56 for
the past several years, they have been a major component of ICE
enforcement activity.57 ICE's behavior-the violent entries, the
threats, the disregard for personal privacy or peace of mind-has
become lawless. Evidence now abounds that officers frequently enter
without consent-that they threaten or intimidate residents, make
misrepresentations of authority, push their way through open doors,
or simply enter without waiting to speak to a resident at all." With no
valid warrants, no exigent circumstances, and often no valid consent,
51. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388 (1989) (holding that a claim of excessive
force during an arrest is properly analyzed under Fourth Amendment standards).
52. See First Amended Complaint, supra note 1, at 11-13 (alleging that agents held a
cooperating, unarmed suspect at gunpoint); CARDOZO IMMIGRATION JUSTICE CLINIC,
supra note 11, at 17 (noting threat to break door down) (citing Sandra Hernandez, ICE
Increases Use of Home Raids, DAILY J. (L.A.), Mar. 26, 2008, at 1); CARDOZO
IMMIGRATION JUSTICE CLINIC, supra note 11, at 18 (citing Aaron Nicodemus, Illegal
Aliens Arrested in Raid: Feds Nab 15 in Milford, TELEGRAM & GAZETTE (Worcester,
Mass.), Dec. 9, 2007, at B) (noting that agents forced open a suspect's door with guns
drawn); see also Robinson v. Solano Cnty., 278 F.3d 1007, 1015 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding
unconstitutional excessive force when police held an unarmed suspect at gunpoint);
United States v. Serna-Barreto, 842 F.2d 965, 967 (7th Cir. 1988) (holding that suspicion of
criminal activity alone does not justify holding suspects at gunpoint).
53. Nina Bernstein, Report Says Immigration Agents Broke Laws and Agency Rules in
Home Raids, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2009, at A20.
54. Id.
55. See, e.g., Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961) ("The Fourth
Amendment, and the personal rights which it secures, have a long history. At the very core
stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from
unreasonable governmental intrusion.").
56. Sandra Hernandez, ICE Increases Use of Home Raids, DAILY J. (L.A.), Mar. 26,
2008, at 1.
57. See MIGRATION POLICY INST., supra note 11, at 3.
58. See sources cited supra notes 30-50.
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one major plank of ICE's interior enforcement efforts depends on
routine violations of a core constitutional guarantee.
Such institutional lawlessness cannot survive without impunity.5 9
Impunity is a condition all too familiar in the history of American law
enforcement. Before Mapp v. Ohio,' the Supreme Court case which
required the suppression of evidence following illegal searches by
state police, impunity was the rule in roughly half of the states.6' As
the Supreme Court came to recognize, these states conferred judicial
approval on such violations through the admission of illegally
acquired evidence.62 The Supreme Court has severely weakened the
utility of the Fourth Amendment in preventing unlawful immigration
enforcement activities.63 This Article will show, however, that even in
immigration matters, impunity is not a given: advocates can refashion
a safeguard against warrantless home raids.
B. The Law of Search and Seizure: A Brief Overview
A discussion of the legality of home raids must start with the
Fourth Amendment, one of the Constitution's chief privacy
safeguards. The Fourth Amendment protects "[tihe right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures."' It provides that
warrants shall only issue "upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized."65 The Amendment was drafted to
answer fears that the expanded federal government contemplated in
the Constitution might engage in the law enforcement abuses that
59. See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1055 (1984) (White, J., dissenting)
(noting the lack of deterrents to unconstitutional conduct absent application of the
exclusionary rule); Elias, supra note 12, at 1146-50 (noting the low deterrence value of
ICE regulations protecting noncitizens).
60. 67 U.S. 643 (1961).
61. See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 224-25 (1960) (listing states allowing or
prohibiting the use of evidence obtained through illegal searches and seizures).
62. See, e.g., Mapp, 367 U.S. at 651-53 (characterizing state remedies short of the
exclusionary rule to be "worthless and futile" in deterring unlawful searches and seizures);
id. at 670 (Douglas, J., concurring) (characterizing the use of unlawfully obtained evidence
as "constitutional sanction").
63. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1050 (holding that the exclusionary rule does not
apply in deportation proceedings). But see id. at 1050-51 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion)
(suggesting that the exclusionary rule might be appropriate for "egregious" constitutional
violations, or more generally should violations become widespread).
64. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
65. Id.
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characterized British rule immediately prior to the Revolution.'
Harkening back to British abuse of "writs of assistance"-
authorizations to engage in broad, invasive searches of many homes
or businesses-Patrick Henry, then an Antifederalist Virginia
legislator, introduced a proposed ban on general warrants; a later
version was adopted as the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution.67
The measure was popular with a public still wary of broad authority
to search. 8
The Fourth Amendment reaches searches and seizures; arrests,
and other actions that interfere with freedom of movement, are
considered seizures of the person.' Officers must justify many types
of searches and seizures in advance, by obtaining a warrant from a
neutral and detached magistrate.70 Much debate surrounds the
"warrant requirement," as some contend the growing list of
exceptions has swallowed the rule." The Fourth Amendment does
not impose a warrant requirement on arrests in public.7 2 Searches or
arrests carried out in the home do require a warrant,7 3 unless carried
out under one of the myriad exceptions.74 Case law has long
emphasized that domestic privacy lies at the heart of the
Amendment; the Supreme Court views intrusions into the home with
skepticism.75
A search or seizure by law enforcement officials must generally
be justified by probable cause, which exists "where the known facts
66. NELSON B. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 92-96 (Leonard W. Levy ed., Da
Capo Press 1970) (1937).
67. Id.; see also Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 583-85 (1980) (discussing the
history of the provision).
68. WILLIAM J. CUDDIHY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: ORIGINS AND ORIGINAL
MEANING, 602-1791, at lix-lxvii (2009).
69. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968) ("[W]henever a police officer accosts
an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has 'seized' that person.").
70. See, e.g., United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 10-12 (1977) (discussing the
application of the warrant requirement to searches of personal effects outside of the
home).
71. See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 582 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("Even
before today's decision, the 'warrant requirement' had become so riddled with exceptions
that it was basically unrecognizable.").
72. See, e.g., Payton, 445 U.S. at 586-87 (noting this "settled rule" but distinguishing
arrests in the home).
73. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001) ("With few exceptions, the
question whether a warrantless search of a home is reasonable and hence constitutional
must be answered no.").
74. For example, when an immediate search is necessary to prevent destruction of
evidence. United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195, 1199 (9th Cir. 1984).
75. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 31.
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and circumstances are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable
prudence in the belief that contraband or evidence of [wrongdoing]
will be found.""6 To make an arrest, an officer must likewise have
probable cause-an objectively reasonable belief that the arrestee
committed a crime.77 Officers may detain a suspect for brief
questioning even if they lack probable cause; such brief stops require
only a reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing, a lower threshold that
nevertheless requires that the officer's belief be rooted in "specific
and articulable facts."" Finally, searches may be justified without a
warrant or probable cause where the property owner gave valid
consent to the search.
The constitutionality of a given home raid might hinge on several
distinct parts of a Fourth Amendment analysis. While the
Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") concedes that ICE
agents conduct such enforcement actions without warrants as
contemplated in the Fourth Amendment, DHS often claims that
consent or some other legal basis justifies the warrantless entry. 0
Residents may, in turn, contend that agents forced their way in
unlawfully." After agents enter the home, they often round up other
residents in a central area in the home, purportedly in the interests of
officer safety, and question them about their immigration status;82
these detentions may constitute seizures subject to the strictures of
the Fourth Amendment. Subsequent searches for identification
documents or other evidence likewise require a constitutional
justification.' Any of these practices may violate the Fourth
Amendment. Such a showing may help justify suppression of
76. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996). For example, to obtain a search
warrant, an officer must show probable cause that a search of a place would likely reveal
evidence or contraband subject to seizure. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983).
77. United States v. Sawyer, 224 F.3d 675, 678-79 (7th Cir. 2000).
78. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 880 (1975).
79. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222 (1973).
80. See Letter from Michael Chertoff to Senator Christopher Dodd, supra note 17, at
2 (discussing administrative warrants of removal, noting that they do not "grant the same
authority to enter dwellings as a judicially approved search or arrest warrant," and
claiming that ICE did not enter dwellings without consent during home investigations in
Connecticut).
81. See infra Parts II.A.1-2.
82. See CARDOZO IMMIGRATION JUSTICE CLINIC, supra note 11, at 17 (noting
reports that agents in home raids seize and question every resident); Letter from Michael
Chertoff to Senator Christopher Dodd, supra note 17, at 2-3 (noting that agents ask
residents to enter a common area and arguing that questioning during home raids does not
require an independent Fourth Amendment justification).
83. See infra Part II.A.4.
84. See infra Part II.A.3.
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evidence gathered in the raid, though justifying suppression in
immigration court requires a more exacting inquiry.'
C. Lopez-Mendoza and Fourth Amendment Evidentiary
Suppression in Immigration Proceedings
Though Fourth Amendment case law most often concerns
encounters between police and the populace, the Amendment
reaches any government actor, including the officials who enforce
civil immigration laws.86 The treatment of immigration hearings as
civil proceedings does affect the remedies available to victims of
Fourth Amendment violations, but case law suggests evidentiary
suppression remains available for "egregious violations" of
constitutional rights."
The text of the Fourth Amendment does not provide a remedy
for violations, but in Mapp v. Ohio the Supreme Court interpreted
the Amendment to require suppression of evidence in subsequent
state criminal proceedings.' Subsequent decisions called into
question the extent to which the Amendment itself requires the
suppression of evidence obtained through an unreasonable search or
seizure, and the Supreme Court now tends to characterize the
exclusionary rule as a judicially created remedy rather than a right
implicit in the Amendment itself.89
85. See infra Part I.C.
86. See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1044-45 (1984) (discussing the INS's
scheme for preventing Fourth Amendment violations by officers); id. at 1052 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) ("The Government of the United States bears an obligation to obey the Fourth
Amendment; that obligation is not lifted simply because the law enforcement officers were
agents of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, nor because the evidence obtained
by those officers was to be used in civil deportation proceedings.").
87. See, e.g., id. at 1050-51 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion) (suggesting suppression is
appropriate for "egregious violations" of the Fourth Amendment); Lopez-Rodriguez v.
Mukasey, 536 F.3d 1012, 1019 (9th Cir. 2008) (suppressing evidence obtained through a
warrantless entry that was found to constitute an egregious Fourth Amendment violation).
88. 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961); see also Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914)
(setting out the exclusionary rule as applied to the federal government).
89. See, e.g., Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 594 (2006) (declining to suppress
evidence obtained after a knock-and-announce violation); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S.
897, 938-39 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that the rule is a "direct
constitutional command" upon the judicial branch); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S.
338, 348 (1974) ("[T]he rule is a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth
Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal
constitutional right of the party aggrieved."). But see Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1051-52
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Amendment itself requires suppression of
evidence).
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The Supreme Court has always classed removal proceedings
differently from criminal trials, suggesting that they are civil and non-
punitive,90 though many Justices have recognized that deportation
works a severe harm on the noncitizen.91 This civil-criminal
distinction affects the protections available: for example, the Sixth
Amendment right to assigned counsel applies only to "criminal
prosecutions."' But the civil-criminal distinction does not necessarily
rule out the use of suppression as a remedy. As late as the 1970s,
many assumed that noncitizens could seek suppression in removal
proceedings for evidence gathered in violation of the Fourth
Amendment.93
In In re Sandoval, the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA")
ruled that the exclusionary rule did not apply to immigration
proceedings.9 4 The question came before the Supreme Court in INS v.
90. See, e.g., Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1038 ("A deportation proceeding is a purely
civil action to determine eligibility to remain in this country, not to punish an unlawful
entry.... The deportation hearing looks prospectively to the respondent's right to remain
in this country in the future."); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 594 (1952)
("Deportation, however severe its consequences, has been consistently classified as a civil
rather than a criminal procedure."). However, according to the conference notes of Justice
Blackmun, Justice Marshall did not believe that deportation proceedings were civil. Elias,
supra note 12, at 1121 n.60. Some authors have taken up the argument that removal
proceedings, in which the government seeks to strip the noncitizen of a liberty interest, are
criminal or quasi-criminal. See, e.g., Peter L. Markowitz, Straddling the Civil-Criminal
Divide: A Bifurcated Approach to Understanding the Nature of Immigration Removal
Proceedings, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 289,289 (2008); see also Scheidemann v. INS, 83
F.3d 1517, 1526-31 (3d Cir. 1996) (Sarokin, J., concurring) (urging the Supreme Court to
reverse its "unrealistic" classification of deportation as civil); Baldini-Potermin et al.,
supra note 24, at 421 (discussing claims that immigration proceedings are now effectively
criminal).
91. See, e.g., Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 497 (1999)
(Ginsburg, J., concurring) (arguing that "deportation is a penalty-at times a most serious
one"); Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 243 (1951) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (considering
deportation a "savage penalty," and "a life sentence of exile"); Fong Yue Ting v. United
States, 149 U.S. 698, 749 (1893) (Field, J., dissenting) (arguing, of the exclusion of long-
term residents: "if a banishment of this sort be not a punishment, and among the severest
of punishments, it would be difficult to imagine a doom to which the name can be
applied").
92. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
93. See, e.g., Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1059 (White, J., dissenting) (noting that the
1980 edition of the field's major treatise suggested the exclusionary rule was available); see
also 6 GITTEL GORDON & CHARLES GORDON, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE
§ 137.03[2][g] (Matthew Bender & Co. rev. ed. 1992) (stating that evidence obtained
through egregious conduct by INS officers that violates due process is suppressible).
94. 17 I. & N. Dec. 70, 70 (B.I.A. 1979). The Board of Immigration Appeals is a
tribunal within the Department of Justice; it hears appeals from the immigration courts
nationwide, and its decisions are binding on immigration judges. Board of Immigration
Appeals, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/eoir/biainfo.htm (last visited Dec.
31, 2010). In most instances, the BIA does not hold oral argument. Id. BIA decisions are
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Lopez-Mendoza, a consolidated appeal concerning two
undocumented noncitizens in deportation proceedings that arose
after workplace raids.95 The decision describes the arrests in question
as "peaceful." 6 The Court, noting the civil nature of removal
proceedings, applied a balancing test to determine whether the
exclusionary rule was appropriate. The Court purported to
weigh the likely social benefits of excluding unlawfully seized
evidence against the likely costs. On the benefit side of the
balance "the 'prime purpose' of the [exclusionary] rule, if not
the sole one, 'is to deter future unlawful police conduct.' " On
the cost side, there is the loss of often probative evidence and
all of the secondary costs that flow from the less accurate or
more cumbersome adjudication that therefore occurs.98
The Court saw the exclusionary rule as inappropriate in light of
the streamlined nature of removal proceedings. It reasoned that so
few noncitizens even challenged their removability, let alone the
admissibility of the government's evidence, that suppression was
likely to have little deterrent effect on immigration officers.9 9 The
Court also claimed that civil suits and INS training procedures and
regulations provided adequate deterrence against violations."oo
In evaluating the costs of the exclusionary rule, the Court
considered the loss of probative evidence and the release of
noncitizens ineligible to remain in the country. 0' With respect to the
latter, the Court assumed the release of noncitizens would require the
judiciary to "close their eyes to ongoing violations of the law."102 The
Court drew an analogy to other civil matters, such as proceedings to
"order[] corrective action at a leaking hazardous waste dump." 03 Two
dissenting Justices took issue with the characterization of unlawful
presence-generally treated as a civil matter-as an ongoing
now reviewed chiefly by the United States courts of appeals. Id.; see also 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(b)(2) (2006).
95. 468 U.S. at 1034-37.
96. Id. at 1051 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion).
97. Id. at 1041-42 (majority opinion); accord United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 454
(1976) (applying balancing test and weighing the costs and benefits of excluding unlawfully
seized evidence).
98. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1041 (quoting Janis, 428 U.S. at 446).
99. Id. at 1044.
100. Id. at 1044-46.
101. Id. at 1049-50.
102. Id. at 1046.
103. Id.
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"crime."" The Court likewise noted the difficulty in adjudicating a
Fourth Amendment dispute following a workplace raid, explaining
that such raids "occur in crowded and confused circumstances" which
make it difficult to assess the legality of one particular arrest. 0 The
majority saw the downsides of the exclusionary rule as significant
enough to preclude Fourth Amendment suppression in removal
proceedings.1os
The holding in Lopez-Mendoza was qualified in important ways,
however. Four Justices in the five-Justice majority were apparently
unwilling to completely rule out an important remedy for
constitutional violations."o7 The Lopez-Mendoza holding, they noted,
did "not deal ... with egregious violations of Fourth Amendment or
other liberties that might transgress notions of fundamental fairness
and undermine the probative value of the evidence obtained."'os
Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion cited Rochin v. California, a case
excluding evidence obtained through gross physical abuse.109 In a
footnote, O'Connor noted that the Board of Immigration Appeals
had crafted a rule suppressing evidence from unlawful arrests or
searches where the use of such evidence would be fundamentally
unfair, such as with respect to "evidence obtained as a result of a
night-time warrantless entry into the aliens' residence." 0 Four
dissenting Justices and four Justices in the majority thus carved out an
exception in dicta for egregious violations of the Fourth Amendment
104. Id. at 1056-58 (White, J., dissenting); id. at 1061 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating
general agreement with Justice White's opinion).
105. Id. at 1049.
106. Id. at 1050.
107. See id. at 1050-51 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion).
108. Id. As the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has noted, this standard
"authorizes exclusion for violations that are egregious either because the violation
'transgressed notions of fundamental fairness,' or ... 'undermine[dJ the probative value of
the evidence obtained.' " Almeida-Amaral v. Gonzales, 461 F.3d 231, 234 (2d Cir. 2006)
(quoting Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1050-51). As the Almeida-Amaral court pointed
out, in Rochin, the case cited by O'Connor, the gross physical abuse that the Court
addressed did not undercut the probative value of the physical evidence recovered, which
in that case was narcotics. Id. at 235 ("The pills were nonetheless suppressed because of
the objectionable method used by the police to obtain them. Indeed, Rochin stated in no
uncertain terms that reliability cannot be the sole touchstone of the Fourth Amendment."
(internal citations omitted) (quoting Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 173 (1952))).
109. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1050-51 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion); Rochin v.
California, 342 U.S. 165, 173 (1952).
110. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1051 n.5 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion) (citing In
re Ramira-Cordova, No. A21 095 659 (B.I.A. Feb. 21, 1980)). For the BIA rule, see In re
Toro, 17 I. & N. Dec. 340,343 (B.I.A. 1980).
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or other liberties."' Four Justices in the majority also conditioned
their holding on the assumption that Fourth Amendment violations
by INS agents were not a common occurrence. 112 They suggested that
their "conclusions concerning the exclusionary rule's value might
change, if there developed good reason to believe that Fourth
Amendment violations by INS officers were widespread."113
This Article will demonstrate that given the weighty
constitutional protection of the home, warrantless, nonconsensual
entries by ICE agents are egregious violations of the Fourth
Amendment. Warrantless home invasions are the "chief evil"
prohibited by the Fourth Amendment, and the protection of the
home is a central feature of the American constitutional tradition and
the common law.114 FOT raids go beyond the offensiveness inherent
in an ordinary warrantless home invasion, as ICE agents often carry
them out on scant evidence and with unnecessary force."' Eight
Justices on the Court at the time of Lopez-Mendoza left open the
possibility of suppressing evidence for "egregious" Fourth
Amendment violations."' If the practices detailed above-kicking
111. See Orhorhaghe v. INS, 38 F.3d 488, 493 n.2 (9th Cir. 1994) ("Although only four
justices joined in this portion of the opinion [suggesting suppression was appropriate for
egregious violations] (Justices O'Connor, Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist), the four
dissenters (Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Stevens) argued that the exclusionary
rule ought ordinarily to apply in deportation hearings. Thus, to the extent such head-
counting is a helpful way of reading Supreme Court opinions, there were eight votes on
the Lopez-Mendoza Court for at least leaving open the possibility that the exclusionary
rule might apply to egregious violations.").
112. See Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1044-45 (discussing the INS's internal
deterrents); id. at 1050 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion) (suggesting there might be a
different result if violations were "widespread").
113. Id. (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion) (citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897,
928 (1984)).
114. See infra Part II.B.3.
115. CARDOZO IMMIGRATION JUSTICE CLINIC, supra note 11, at 16-22 (citing twenty-
five examples of ICE misconduct nationwide since 2006); see, e.g., First Amended
Complaint, supra note 1, at 11-12 (alleging that agents held an unarmed and cooperative
suspect at gunpoint while conducting a warrantless search of his home, before suggesting
he leave the neighborhood for several days to avoid being detained again); Aaron
Nicodemus, Illegal Aliens Arrested in Raid: Feds Nab 15 in Milford, TELEGRAM &
GAZETTE (Worcester, Mass.), Dec. 9, 2007, at B1 (describing how "eight to 10 ICE agents,
with guns drawn, broke through the door," and told the occupants to lie down on the floor
while agents inspected each resident's papers); see also In re R-C- & J-C-, slip op. at 11-12
(N.Y.C. Immigr. Ct., May 12, 2010) (finding that agents entered the respondents'
apartment without permission and pulled a gun on one respondent when he put his hand
in his pocket) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
116. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1050-51 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion); id. at 1051
(Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 1056 (White, J., dissenting); id. at 1060 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting); id. at 1061 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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down a suspect's front door and entering with guns drawn"'-do not
constitute an egregiously unreasonable search, it is difficult to
imagine what might.
The Court in Lopez-Mendoza also left open a parallel claim for
suppression: advocates can urge that widespread constitutional rights
violations now justify wholesale reevaluation of the conclusions of the
Court.1 The conduct of interior immigration enforcement since
Lopez-Mendoza provides a damning rejoinder to the Court's
conclusion that suppression is a weak deterrent to Fourth
Amendment violations by immigration officers, as ICE, now largely
unchecked by the exclusionary rule, often engages in unconstitutional
searches and seizures."9 Home raids in particular represent such
systematic and flagrant abuse of constitutional rights that they alone
could justify the Supreme Court's reconsideration of Lopez-Mendoza
under the "widespread violations" exception.120
Finally, the immigration courts have developed their own
mechanisms for policing regulatory violations by officials, and the
federal government has created a regulatory scheme that purports to
protect some of the basic rights of noncitizens.12' Advocates may
make use of this scheme as a third alternative ground for suppression
of evidence gathered in home raids, one which may in some instances
justify suppression more readily than constitutional claims. 22
Lopez-Mendoza weakened the exclusionary rule in a manner
that has allowed routine violations of the constitutional rights of
noncitizens, not to mention citizen victims of ICE raids.123 But
suppression is not a dead letter in immigration proceedings. ICE has,
in a sense, revitalized suppression by the severity and scope of its own
misconduct. Advocates have a number of claims that could safeguard
the rights of noncitizens swept up in home raids. Institutional
deterrents against constitutional violations by ICE officials have
failed; 24 advocates ought to help fashion a new deterrent by
117. See supra Part I.A.
118. See Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1050 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion).
119. Elias, supra note 12, at 1146-50.
120. See infra Part III.
121. See infra Part IV.
122. See infra Part IV. These regulations parallel constitutional protections. See, e.g., 8
C.F.R. § 287.8(f)(2) (2010) (imposing a warrant requirement). As such, this Article will
address constitutional claims first; practitioners may depend on constitutional case law to
flesh out the parameters of regulatory provisions.
123. See, e.g., First Amended Complaint, supra note 1, at 3-4, 9-11 (alleging that ICE
agents forcibly entered the home of a citizen without a warrant).
124. Elias, supra note 12, at 1146-50.
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vigorously asserting the constitutional and regulatory rights of their
clients.
II. SUPPRESSING EVIDENCE FOR EGREGIOUS FOURTH
AMENDMENT VIOLATIONS DURING HOME RAIDS
Since Lopez-Mendoza, the United States courts of appeals have
allowed suppression for egregious violations of the Fourth
Amendment.'25 In Lopez-Mendoza, the Supreme Court also
expressed a willingness to revisit the applicability of the exclusionary
rule more generally, should authorities begin to engage in widespread
violations of the Constitution. Advocates defending victims of home
raids should assert their clients' rights through both of these
avenues.126 For either sort of challenge, the noncitizen must first
prove that authorities violated her Fourth Amendment rights. This
Article will thus set out ways to demonstrate constitutional violations
in scenarios that regularly arise in reports of home raids.
A. Showing Unconstitutionality: Warrantless Home Invasions Are
Presumptively Unreasonable
The warrant requirement remains at its strongest in the home:
warrantless searches of private dwellings are presumptively
unreasonable. 127 ICE may not justify entering homes without prior
judicial authorization, consent, or exigent circumstances. 128 Since
FOTs generally carry out pre-planned raids with administrative
warrants insufficient to justify a home invasion, 29 they must justify
125. See infra note 281.
126. See infra Parts II.B (egregious nature of home raids), III (widespread violations
exception); see also infra Part IV (discussing related regulatory claims for suppression).
127. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001) (citing Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S.
177, 181 (1990); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980)).
128. See infra Part I.B.
129. FOTs depend on arrest warrants that designated law enforcement officials issue
pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 287.5(e)(2), which provides a list of forty-nine different job titles
authorized to issue warrants. The list includes "[p]atrol agents in charge" and "[a]ssistant
patrol agents in charge." 8 C.F.R. § 287.5(e)(2) (2010). Such warrants reflect the agency's
determination that a noncitizen is in violation of immigration law and is subject to arrest;
since they do not reflect an independent judicial determination of probable cause, they are
not warrants as contemplated by the Fourth Amendment. See infra Part II.A.1 (arguing
that administrative warrants permissible in other contexts may not be used in immigration
enforcement); see also Letter from Michael Chertoff to Senator Christopher Dodd, supra
note 17, at 2 (noting that FOTs rely on administrative warrants that do not "grant the
same authority to enter dwellings" as judicial warrants).
In some major enforcement operations, ICE has not obtained warrants at all. See,
e.g., Bernstein, supra note 48 ("We didn't have warrants .... We don't need warrants to
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entries based on consent.130 Where officers force their way into
homes, or where they enter through threats or false claims of
authority, claims of consent must fail.'"' Even where ICE validly
enters a home, however, their subsequent conduct may violate the
Fourth Amendment. FOTs regularly sweep suspects' homes and
round up all residents into common areas.132 Even where ICE enters
with the consent of residents, this type of indiscriminate detention
and interrogation may work a separate Fourth Amendment violation
if not justified by legitimate officer safety concerns or valid
investigative purposes.133 Finally, FOTs also carry out in-home
searches (generally, for documents) that may exceed the scope of any
plausible claims of consent.'34
1. The Fourth Amendment Bars Home Raids Absent Consent,
Exigent Circumstances, or a Judicially Issued Warrant
The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and
seizures, and warrantless entries into the home are presumptively
unreasonable." This "basic principle of Fourth Amendment law"
often arises in criminal cases when parties seek suppression of
evidence for some allegedly unlawful home invasion,'3 6 but the
warrant requirement applies to government intrusions unrelated to
criminal investigations."' While the Supreme Court has created less
make the arrests. These are illegal immigrants." (quoting an ICE Office of Investigations
special agent)).
130. See, e.g., Letter from Michael Chertoff to Senator Christopher Dodd, supra note
17, at 2 (claiming, of New Haven home raids, "[a]t no time did any ICE FOTs enter a
dwelling without consent").
131. See infra Part II.A.2 (discussing claims of consent and citing examples of
nonconsensual entries).
132. See CARDOZO IMMIGRATION JUSTICE CLINIC, supra note 11, at 16-22 (discussing
the pattern of suspicionless mass interrogation and citing examples); see also Letter from
Michael Chertoff to Senator Christopher Dodd, supra note 17, at 2 (noting, in reference to
New Haven raids, that FOTs ask that all persons present in the home enter common areas
for officer safety).
133. See infra Part IV.
134. See infra Part III.
135. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980).
136. Id. (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 477 (1971)).
137. See Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 506 (1978) (noting that "[s]earches for
administrative purposes, like searches for evidence of crime, are encompassed by the
Fourth Amendment" and fall under the warrant requirement); G.M. Leasing Corp. v.
United States, 429 U.S. 338, 354, 359 (1977) (holding that a search conducted to seize
property to satisfy unpaid taxes was subject to the warrant requirement of the Fourth
Amendment); see also Ill. Migrant Council v. Pilliod, 531 F. Supp. 1011, 1020 (N.D. Ill.
1982) (upholding injunction restricting immigration raids in migrant dwellings and noting
that the law requires judicially issued warrants for such raids).
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exacting warrant standards for certain types of civil regulatory
inspections, it has never suggested that law enforcement may force its
way into a dwelling absent a judicially issued warrant, valid consent,
or exigent circumstances.' 8 ICE's practice-entering homes with
administrative warrants or no warrant at all' 39-thus violates the
Fourth Amendment unless consent or exigent circumstances justify
each entry.140 For its part, the DHS has conceded that its
administrative warrants do not justify entry without consent; the
following discussion fleshes out a response should ICE assert a
different position in litigation.141
Several Supreme Court decisions have upheld warrantless or
"administrative warrant" searches in the course of administrative
schemes designed to protect the public. For example, Michigan v.
Tyler'4 ' addressed a fire department's search of a business after a
blaze believed to be the result of arson.143 The Court upheld the
searches the fire fighters carried out in the immediate wake of the
fire, which the Court saw as necessary to identify the cause of the fire
and to prevent a recurrence.'" In Camara v. Municipal Court of San
Francisco,'145 the Supreme Court suggested that housing-safety
inspectors could obtain "area warrants" without individualized
determinations of probable cause in order to carry out searches
needed to safeguard the public.1" Camara discussed a number of
factors supporting the Court's finding that such searches would be
reasonable. First, housing safety inspections enjoyed "a long history
of judicial and public acceptance."147 Second, the inspections were
supported by the public interest in the abatement of "dangerous
conditions."148 The Court doubted that anything but house-to-house
138. See Camara v. Mun. Court of S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 528-30 (1967) (discussing earlier
cases and noting that Fourth Amendment protections attach whether or not the person is
suspected of criminal activity).
139. See supra notes 33-54 (describing warrantless, nonconsensual entries by ICE
agents).
140. See Ill. Migrant Council, 531 F. Supp. at 1023-24 (requiring judicial warrants for
INS dwelling searches).
141. See Letter from Michael Chertoff to Senator Christopher Dodd, supra note 17, at
2 (noting that administrative arrest warrants do not convey the same authority to enter as
judicially issued warrants).
142. 436 U.S. 499 (1978).
143. Id. at 500.
144. Id. at 509-10. The Court went on to suppress evidence from subsequent
warrantless searches the firefighters carried out long after the fire. Id. at 511.
145. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
146. Id. at 539-40.
147. Id. at 537 (citing Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 367-71 (1959)).
148. Id.
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inspections could achieve "acceptable results."'49 Third, the
inspections involved "a relatively limited invasion of the urban
citizen's privacy": they were "neither personal in nature nor aimed at
the discovery of evidence of crime." 5 The administrative scheme at
issue did not allow for entry by force.'s'
As one federal court has found, home raids present a very
different picture.152 They are quite definitely "personal in nature," as
they are at least nominally designed to effect the arrest and
deportation of specific individuals.s3 Unlike a peaceful and routine
search by a housing inspector, a home raid presents a severe intrusion
into the residents' privacy, as officers corral every single resident of
the house to interrogate them about their immigration status.154
Unlike the Camara searches, moreover, immigration raids often
involve the use of force, with armed officers who sometimes threaten
residents.' 5 Camara searches are used to avoid "dangerous
conditions" that jeopardize the health of city-dwellers; the
administrative searches discussed in Tyler are used to prevent fires. 156
Immigration raids, on the other hand, are used for civil law
enforcement, not to protect the public from immediate physical
danger.' There is little to indicate that immigration authorities
would be unduly hindered by the need to seek judicial approval
before interfering with a core constitutional right; authorities have a
host of other enforcement options at their disposal, such as workplace
enforcement.' Finally, unlike housing safety inspections, forced
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 540.
152. Ill. Migrant Council v. Pilliod, 531 F. Supp. 1011, 1022-23 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (holding
that dwelling searches by the INS meet none of the Camara factors and thus require
traditional warrants).
153. See Letter from Michael Chertoff to Senator Christopher Dodd, supra note 17, at
1-2 (stating that FOTs aim to identify and arrest "specific" fugitives).
154. CARDOZO IMMIGRATION JUSTICE CLINIC, supra note 11, at 16-17.
155. See supra note 115.
156. Camara, 387 U.S. at 537; Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 506 (1978).
157. The government acknowledges that most noncitizens caught up in home raids
have no criminal conviction history. MIGRATION POLICY INST., supra note 11, at 1-2
(noting, based on government-provided statistics, that seventy-three percent of those
arrested in recent years had no criminal convictions).
158. See Ill. Migrant Council v. Pilliod, 531 F. Supp. 1011, 1022-23 (N.D. Ill. 1982)
(suggesting the warrant requirement would not impede immigration enforcement). In any
case, the warrant requirement
is not an inconvenience to be somehow 'weighed' against the claims of police
efficiency. It is, or should be, an important working part of our machinery of
government, operating as a matter of course to check the 'well-intentioned but
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home raids do not enjoy a "long history of judicial or public
acceptance."' Local, state, and federal officials have decried the use
of home raids."so One federal court has imposed the use of traditional
warrants.' When Congress created relaxed warrant provisions for
border searches, it specifically exempted dwellings.162
The weight of experience counsels against creating a warrant
exception for ICE home invasions, as ICE's use of administrative
arrest warrants has shown that the agency does not engage in the sort
of fact-finding necessary to protect privacy and property rights. For
example, in 2007, ICE agents raided a number of homes in Nassau
County, New York, purportedly targeting gang members with past
immigration violations.'63 After the raids, Nassau County Police
Commissioner Lawrence Mulvey told the New York Times that
ninety of the ninety-six administrative arrest warrants that ICE
officials issued contained incorrect or outdated address
information.'" In one case, "agents were seeking a 28-year-old man
with a photo taken when he was 7."16 ICE declined the police
department's offer to check its information against the county's up-
to-date database. 66 The data sources ICE has used to plan Fugitive
Operations are outdated and unreliable. A 2007 report by the
Department of Homeland Security's Office of the Inspector General
("OIG") quoted one ICE supervisor as saying that ICE's database
had "been neglected for the past 25 years." 167 One analyst told the
OIG that "approximately 50% of the data in the database is accurate,
mistakenly overzealous executive officers' who are a part of any system of law
enforcement.
United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 315-16 (1972) (quoting Coolidge v.
New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 481 (1971)).
159. Camara, 387 U.S. at 537.
160. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
161. Ill. Migrant Council, 531 F. Supp. at 1023-24.
162. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(3) (2006) (allowing certain warrantless searches near the
border, but excluding dwellings).




167. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., AN ASSESSMENT OF
UNITED STATES IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT'S FUGITIVE
OPERATIONS TEAMS 15 (2007) [hereinafter OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN.], available at
http://www.dhs.gov/xoig/assets/mgmtrpts/OIG_07-34_MarO7.pdf. While the agency
subsequently switched to a different database system, the new platform incorporated data
from the old, purportedly deficient and inaccurate system. MIGRATION POLICY INST.,
supra note 11, at 6-7.
531
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
and there is more incomplete than inaccurate information." 6
Unreliable administrative procedures cannot substitute for judicial
determination when a central Fourth Amendment right is at stake.
"[P]hysical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the
wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed," 16 9 and it is a "basic
principle" of the Fourth Amendment that a home invasion, whether
to effect a search or an arrest, requires a judicially issued warrant,
consent, or exigent circumstances. 17 0 Courts may not uphold such
searches on administrative warrants by executive-branch officials; to
do so would place a core constitutional guarantee in the hands of
officers "engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out"
violations of the law."' The Constitution "does not contemplate the
executive officers of Government as neutral and disinterested
magistrates," and "those charged with this investigative and
prosecutorial duty should not be the sole judges of when to utilize
constitutionally sensitive means in pursuing their tasks."'72 Without
prior judicial authorization, a warrantless home raid is presumptively
unreasonable.
2. Challenging Warrantless Entry: Rebutting Claims of Consent
Given the presumptive unreasonableness of any warrantless
home entry,173 ICE generally justifies FOT raids by claiming teams
only enter dwellings with the consent of residents.174 This Article will
deal less with claims of exigent circumstances, given that home raids
are generally pre-planned to a degree that would preclude a finding
of exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless search.175 ICE home
raids appear to frequently involve coerced "consent": FOTs
168. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 167, at 20.
169. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585 (1980) (quoting United States v. U.S. Dist.
Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972)).
170. Id. at 587 (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 477-78 (1971)).
171. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
172. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 280 (1973) (Powell, J.,
concurring) (quoting United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 317 (1972));
see also McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455-56 (1948) ("The right of privacy [is]
deemed too precious to entrust to the discretion of those whose job is the detection of
crime .... Power is a heady thing; and history shows that the police acting on their own
cannot be trusted. And so the Constitution requires a magistrate to pass on the desires of
the police before they violate the privacy of the home.").
173. See supra Part II.A.1.
174. See, e.g., Letter from Michael Chertoff to Senator Christopher Dodd, supra note
17, at 2 (arguing that ICE carried out the New Haven home raids with the consent of
residents).
175. See MIGRATION POLICY INST., supra note 11, at 6-7 (discussing the planning of
FOT raids).
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frequently approach residences with several armed officers, who
often mislead residents into believing they have legal authority to
enter.176 Some simply force their way into residences or threaten to
kick down doors.177 Under such circumstances, advocates should
readily be able to show a Fourth Amendment violation.
The government bears the burden of proving that, under the
totality of the circumstances, agents had a resident's free and
voluntary consent to search the dwelling."' Under this " 'jealously
and carefully drawn' exception,"179 courts consider a number of
factors in analyzing whether consent was voluntary; they look both to
the characteristics of the encounter and to the characteristics of the
person giving the purported consent.s Agents need not warn
residents that they have the right to refuse consent to search:
knowledge of the right to refuse consent is one factor, though it alone
is not dispositive."' On the other hand, consent is not voluntary
176. See, e.g., CARDOZO IMMIGRATION JUSTICE CLINIC, supra note 11, at 20 (citing
Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and
Damages at 16, Arias v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, No. 07-CV-1959
ADM/JSM (D. Minn. Apr. 30, 2008), 2008 WL 4523531 ("When asked by Plaintiffs to
identify themselves, Defendant ICE agents falsely claimed 'It's the Police!' ")); Stephanie
Francis Ward, Illegal Aliens on I.C.E.: Tougher Immigration Enforcement Tactics Spur
Challenges, 94 A.B.A. J. 44, 44 (2008) (reporting that when residents asked agents in one
home raid whether they had a warrant, one agent replied, "[w]e don't need one").
177. See, e.g., Lopez-Rodriguez v. Mukasey, 536 F.3d 1012, 1016-17 (9th Cir. 2008)
(finding that ICE agents entered through the Respondent's front door without
permission); Class Action Complaint at 5, Aguilar v. Immigration & Customs
Enforcement, No. 1:07-cv-08224-JGK (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2007) (alleging that ICE officers
kicked in the plaintiff's entry door without a warrant); First Amended Complaint, supra
note 1, at 17 ("At least one of the Defendants threatened to break down the door and
throw 'gas' inside the home if Plaintiff Espitia and her family did not comply with their
orders."); First Amended Complaint, supra note 1, at 20 (alleging that ICE agents
damaged one door and four windows in warrantless entries into trailer homes); First
Amended Complaint, supra note 1, at 11-13 (alleging that agents held a suspect at
gunpoint outside of his home while effecting a warrantless, nonconsensual search of the
house); CARDOZO IMMIGRATION JUSTICE CLINIC, supra note 11, at 17 (stating that when
a resident asked agents for a search warrant, they "threatened to break his door down").
As discussed previously ICE's claims of consent have attracted suspicion from local
officials. After a series of raids in Nassau County, New York, Police Commissioner
Lawrence Mulvey stated that he found ICE's assertion of consent to enter every suspect
home "not credible even under the best of circumstances." CARDOZO IMMIGRATION
JUSTICE CLINIC, supra note 11, at 16.
178. See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 557 (1980); Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248-49 (1973).
179. Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 109 (2006) (quoting Jones v. United States,
357 U.S. 493, 499 (1958)).
180. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226.
181. Id. at 227.
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where it follows a false "claim of lawful authority" to search.1 " The
Supreme Court has called such searches "instinct with coercion-
albeit colorably lawful coercion. Where there is coercion there cannot
be consent.""s' For example, if officials state they will search with or
without permission, the resident's subsequent consent is not valid.184
Officer conduct may also show coercion, as where officers use
physical force or outnumber or intimidate a suspect. 8 The time and
location of a police encounter are also considerations. Courts often
find nighttime searches to be nonconsensual, for example.186 Finally,
the resident's own state of mind may help show coercion. Coercion is
more likely where the resident speaks little English or where he feels
intimidated by officers.'8 1 Courts are likewise more prone to find
coercion where the person "consenting" had little experience in
dealing with American law enforcement."*
Consent to search is a fact-specific inquiry often hinging on small
details. For example, if a suspect opens the door for police and, upon
request, steps aside and motions for them to enter, he may have given
valid consent. 8 If a suspect opens the door for police and steps aside
without a word (say, to prevent the officers, whom he believes intend
to enter, from knocking him down), he has not given valid consent.190
182. Id. at 233-34 (citing cases and discussing Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543,
548-49 (1968)).
183. Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 550 (1968).
184. See, e.g., People v. Kaigler, 118 N.W.2d 406, 413 (Mich. 1962) ("In view of
Detective Harris' statement that defendant's home was going to be searched even if
defendant did not give the keys to the police, it cannot be said that defendant consented
free from duress and coercion."); see also Lightford v. State, 520 P.2d 955, 957 (Nev. 1974)
(holding that officer's threat to kick the door in tainted consent).
185. See, e.g., Harless v. Turner, 456 F.2d 1337, 1338 (10th Cir. 1972) (noting that
'coercion necessarily flowing from the presence of a number of sheriffs officers"); People
v. Gonzalez, 347 N.E.2d 575, 581 (N.Y. 1976) (noting force and restraint as factors, and
finding coercion where many officers "swarmed" into suspect's apartment).
186. See, e.g., United States v. Calhoun, 542 F.2d 1094, 1102 (9th Cir. 1976) (holding as
erroneous the determination that consent for the nighttime search was voluntary); Harless,
456 F.2d at 1338 (listing factors demonstrating lack of consent, including the late hour of
the search); State v. Wolfe, 398 So. 2d 1117, 1121 (La. 1981) (finding no consent for armed
officers' late-night entry).
187. United States v. Isiofia, 370 F.3d 226, 231-33 (2d Cir. 2004); see also United States
v. Benitez-Arreguin, 973 F.2d 823, 826, 829 (10th Cir. 1992) (discussing and affirming trial
court's finding of no valid consent where the suspect spoke no English and the officer
indicated he wanted to search the suspect's bag only through hand gestures).
188. See Gonzalez, 347 N.E.2d at 581.
189. Johnson v. State, 635 S.E.2d 278, 282 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006).
190. See United States v. Albrektsen, 151 F.3d 951, 955 (9th Cir. 1998) (discussing
examples of "implied consent"); see also Turner v. State, 754 A.2d 1074, 1083 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 2000) (declining to find implied consent where suspect walked through front
door without shutting it behind him).
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When the government seeks to justify a warrantless search based
on consent, it must show the consent of an "individual possessing
authority." 91 For example, a roommate or other co-resident may give
valid consent to search the common areas of an apartment,19 and a
landlord generally may not consent to the search of a tenant's
dwelling.193 The Fourth Amendment protects homes both lavish and
humble alike: courts have suppressed evidence gathered in boarding
houses and other shared residences.194 ICE may not seek the consent
of one resident to search every private room in a shared home or
boarding house and they cannot disregard doors separating separate
dwellings in a shared building."
Since the government bears the burden of showing voluntary
consent,196 noncitizens seeking suppression have the straightforward
burden of proving that a search occurred absent a judicially issued
warrant. ICE must justify such searches by officer testimony or
otherwise. Often, the records ICE introduces into evidence make
conclusory statements as to consent-for example, "[C]onsent to
enter was obtained from Fabiola Gastelum-Lopez.""' ICE
regulations require officers to record any consent entries."'
Advocates should flesh out the circumstances of such searches,
through testimony and physical evidence of officer conduct, whether
or not ICE introduces evidence or claims of consent. ICE's use of
especially coercive tactics may help to show egregiousness. The
heavy-handed methods that ICE agents employ in FOT raids show
that, all too often, such raids depend on intimidation rather than
consent.199
191. Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 109 (2006).
192. Id. (discussing conflicts between co-residents); Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177,
189 (1990) (holding a search valid where police reasonably believed former cotenant had
valid authority over premises to be searched).
193. Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 616-17 (1961).
194. See, e.g., McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948) (involving a
boarding house); Anobile v. Pelligrino, 303 F.3d 107, 119-20 (2d Cir. 2002) (citing cases to
discuss the search of a racing jockey dormitory); Smyth v. Lubbers, 398 F. Supp. 777, 785
(W.D. Mich. 1975) (involving a college dormitory). The Supreme Court has distinguished
motor homes by analogy to the "automobile exception." See California v. Carney, 471 U.S.
386, 393 (1985).
195. See Anobile, 303 F.3d at 119-20 ("Privacy expectations are high in homes, or even
private rooms.").
196. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222 (1973) (citing Bumper v. North
Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548 (1968)).
197. Lopez-Rodriguez v. Mukasey, 536 F.3d 1012, 1017 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting
government evidence introduced in a suppression case).
198. 8 C.F.R. § 287.8(f)(2) (2010).
199. See supra Part I.A.
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3. Challenging ICE Searches Within the Home
Reports of home raids indicate that, after entering suspects'
homes, officers frequently search the premises for documents
indicating alienage, country of origin, or immigration status.2m Even if
the government establishes consent to enter a home, subsequent
searches within a home may constitute separate Fourth Amendment
violations. Consent searches must be delimited by the scope of
consent, measured under a standard of "objective reasonableness."2 0 1
That is, an officer with permission to enter a home may do so, but
may not scour the house for evidence or break open locked
containers within it unless it is "objectively reasonable" to infer
permission to do so.202
The scope of consent is a fact-specific inquiry, though case law
suggests a few principles valuable to victims of home raids.203 For
example, mere failure to object to additional searches does not,
without more, expand limited consent.2" On the other hand, where
officers have general permission to search an area, they may look
through unlocked containers, but not break open locks.205 Finally,
permission to enter a house does not, without more, justify a search of
every room.2 " Given that FOTs conduct intensive, house-wide
searches, many immigrants could likely prevail on scope-of-consent
arguments even where the government can prove a consensual entry.
4. Challenging ICE Interrogation and Detention of Residents
ICE frequently enters homes on coerced "consent" in violation
of the Fourth Amendment.207 Advocates should attack the legality of
such entries, and in turn the admissibility of evidence officers obtain
200. See CARDOZO IMMIGRATION JUSTICE CLINIC, supra note 11, at 17-20.
201. Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991).
202. See id. at 251-52 ("It is very likely unreasonable to think that a suspect, by
consenting to the search of his trunk, has agreed to the breaking open of a locked
briefcase within the trunk, but it is otherwise with respect to a closed paper bag.").
203. See generally 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 3.10(f) (3d
ed. 2007) (detailing courts' treatment of the scope of consent based on a variety of factual
scenarios).
204. See United States v. Wald, 216 F.3d 1222, 1228 (10th Cir. 2000) (citing United
States v. Gordon, 173 F.3d 761, 766 (10th Cir. 1999)).
205. Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 251-52; see also United States v. De La Rosa, 922 F.2d 675,
679 (11th Cir. 1991) (upholding a search in which officers opened a notebook within a car
they had general permission to search).
206. See, e.g., United States v. Mejia, 953 F.2d 461, 466 (9th Cir. 1991) ("[C]onsent to
enter one's threshold for the limited purpose of talking about an investigation does not
include permission to enter a bedroom occupied by a sleeping spouse.").
207. See CARDOZO IMMIGRATION JUSTICE CLINIC, supra note 11, at 9-10.
536 [Vol. 89
2011] IMMIGRANTS & WARRANTLESS HOME RAIDS
through searches in the home or subsequent interrogations. ICE
routinely detains and questions every person in a given home.208
Advocates should also challenge the validity of such detentions, as
each one constitutes a seizure subject to Fourth Amendment
restrictions. 209  Then-Secretary of Homeland Security Michael
Chertoff justified such questioning in light of agents' statutory
authority "to interrogate any alien or person believed to be an alien
as to his right to be or to remain in the United States." 210 Indeed, the
Supreme Court has held that questioning a detained person as to her
immigration status does not constitute a separate search or seizure
and does not require an independent legal basis-that is, if officers
have a legal basis to stop or arrest a person, they need no further
justification to ask questions about the person's immigration status.211
Former Secretary Chertoff articulated an officer safety rationale
for routinely detaining every resident of a house during a raid.212
While officer safety may justify brief detentions of bystanders, it does
not justify full arrest without probable cause. Case law provides
grounds for advocates to attack both the validity of bystander
detentions (as unsupported by actual officer safety needs) 213 and their
scope (as severe enough to constitute a full arrest requiring probable
cause).2 14 ICE may also seek to justify detaining collateral arrestees
under the Terry v. Ohio standard, which allows brief, investigatory
detentions based on articulable reasonable suspicion. 215 Advocates
may argue that officers lacked a reasonable suspicion or that the
208. See id. at 14, 16-22 (discussing a "national pattern" of such sweeps and citing
examples).
209. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968) (noting that "whenever a police officer accosts
an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has 'seized' that person" within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment).
210. Immigration and Nationality Act § 287(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(1) (2006); see
Letter from Michael Chertoff to Senator Christopher Dodd, supra note 17, at 2 (citing
§ 1357(a)(1)).
211. Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 100-01 (2005); see also Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S.
429, 434-35 (1991) ("[M]ere police questioning does not constitute a seizure ... even when
officers have no basis for suspecting a particular individual, they may generally ask
questions of that individual.").
212. See Letter from Michael Chertoff to Senator Christopher Dodd, supra note 17, at
2-3 (noting that officers asked occupants present during New Haven home raids to enter
common areas for officer safety).
213. See, e.g., United States v. Maddox, 388 F.3d 1356, 1362-63 (10th Cir. 2004)
(describing limitations on the right to detain individuals on officer-safety grounds.
214. See infra Parts II.A.4(a)-(b).
215. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968).
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detention was so severe as to constitute a de facto arrest beyond the
limits of Terry.216
a. House Sweeps and Collateral Detentions During Home Raids
Though a home raid often has a nominal target, such as a
particular absconder or "criminal alien," ICE FOTs often detain
every person in the home.217 Former Secretary Chertoff described the
practice used in a series of home raids in New Haven, Connecticut:
"[A]fter consent [to enter the home] was obtained, the occupant was
asked how many other individuals were in the house. If other persons
were present, those individuals were asked to come into a common
area for officer safety." 218 Agents then questioned the other residents
as to their immigration status.219
Chertoff's dry description is at odds with first-person accounts:
ICE agents often enter homes at night, sometimes with weapons
drawn, and demand that the frightened and confused residents gather
in a common area as agents ransack the house in search of
documents.220 Advocates have charged that "officer safety" is a
pretext and that ICE aims to maximize "collateral arrests" obtained
through intimidating in-home interrogation.221
b. The Validity of "Protective" Sweeps and Collateral
Detentions Under Maryland v. Buie, Muehler v. Mena, and
Homeland Security Regulations
The Supreme Court has discussed "protective sweeps" of homes
in which officers conduct a "cursory visual inspection" of a house for
possible armed confederates who may attack officers during a valid
216. See infra Part II.A.4(c); see, e.g., Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 212 (1979).
217. CARDOZO IMMIGRATION JUSTICE CLINIC, supra note 11, at 16-17.
218. Letter from Michael Chertoff to Senator Christopher Dodd, supra note 17, at 2.
219. Id. at 2-3.
220. See CARDOZO IMMIGRATION JUSTICE CLINIC, supra note 11, at 16-17 ("Once
inside the homes, the lawsuits, suppression motions and news accounts all tell a similar
story of ICE agents abandoning focus on a purported target and instead immediately
seizing and questioning all occupants about their immigration status .... [O]nce ICE
agents . .. detain all occupants, they generally conduct an illegal non-consensual search of
the premises looking for evidence of the occupants' immigration status .... ") (endnote
omitted); see also Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive
Relief and Damages at 18, Arias v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, No. 07-
CV-1959-ADM-JSM (D. Minn. Apr. 30,2008), 2008 WL 4523531 ("[Algents went room to
room, searching each room, rooting through closets, dressers, beds, and generally leaving a
mess of personal property in their wake. Any Latino persons found were brought to a
central location in the home to be detained and interrogated by additional ICE agents.
Latinos were then interrogated, often aggressively and invariably in handcuffs.").
221. See CARDOZO IMMIGRATION JUSTICE CLINIC, supra note 11, at 16-17.
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in-home arrest.222 The Supreme Court has never, however, ruled on
the validity of detentions for officer safety during a warrantless home
invasion.22 3 Case law suggests-and at least one circuit has held-that
during a warrantless entry, officials may not detain others on the
scene without "a 'reasonable belief, based on specific and articulable
facts[,]' that the individual poses a danger." 24 Under such a standard,
ICE must justify its practice of rounding up and interrogating entire
households through case-specific facts, not blanket assertions of
officer safety concerns. Since ICE FOTs routinely target non-
dangerous immigrants, 225 advocates can and should challenge such
detentions as Fourth Amendment seizures unsupported by probable
cause or reasonable suspicion.
While the Supreme Court has never set out a standard governing
the detention of bystanders during a warrantless home invasion,
related opinions provide some guidance. In Maryland v. Buie,226 the
Supreme Court established a standard allowing a "properly limited
protective sweep in conjunction with an in-home arrest."227 Officers
may conduct a sweep of the home if they have "a reasonable belief
based on specific and articulable facts that the area to be swept
harbors an individual posing a danger to those on the arrest scene."228
They may conduct only a "cursory inspection" focused on those parts
of the home that could harbor an attacker.229
222. Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 327 (1990).
223. See Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 701, 703 (1982) (allowing detention of
residents of a home, absent individualized suspicion, during the execution of a judicially
issued search warrant, but distinguishing warrantless searches by noting the "prime
importance" of the warrant in the determination that the detentions were valid).
224. United States v. Maddox, 388 F.3d 1356, 1363 (10th Cir. 2004) (alteration in
original) (quoting Buie, 494 U.S. at 337). In Maddox, the court upheld the detention of a
bystander during the in-home arrest of a known drug trafficker, in light of a number of
factors: the officer was outnumbered, the home was the site of previous violent crimes, the
arrest took place around nightfall, and the officer had reason to believe the bystander
might be armed. Id. at 1366; see also Buie, 494 U.S. at 334-35 (emphasizing that officers
must have a reasonable suspicion of danger for even a "cursory" protective sweep of the
premises during a warrantless arrest in a home).
225. See MIGRATION POLICY INST., supra note 11, at 13 (noting that, based on data
provided by DHS, "fugitive aliens posing a threat to the community or with a violent
criminal conviction represented just 2 percent of all arrests in FY 2007.").
226. Buie, 494 U.S. 325 (1990).
227. Id. at 337.
228. Id. at 336-37. Buie distinguished the situation addressed in Chimel v. California,
395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969), which allowed for a more intensive search for weapons or
destructible evidence in the area immediately around a suspect; officers may conduct such
a search only incident to a valid custodial arrest. Buie, 494 U.S. at 336-37.
229. Buie, 494 U.S. at 335.
539
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
The Buie Court discussed the principles set out in Chimel v.
California,230 which suggested that a warrantless search in the home
must be limited, its scope " 'strictly tied to and justified by' the
circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible."23 ' The Buie
Court specifically declined to broaden a preexisting rule, from
Michigan v. Summers,232 which allowed detention of residents without
reasonable suspicion during the execution of a judicially issued search
warrant for contraband." Summers depended upon
the fact that the police had obtained a warrant to search
respondent's house for contraband. A neutral and detached
magistrate had found probable cause to believe that the law was
being violated in that house and had authorized a substantial
invasion of the privacy of the persons who resided there.234
In contrast, officer conduct during even a valid warrantless home
invasion must be limited in scope; the Chimel and Buie Courts
rejected the premise that "simply because some interference with an
individual's privacy and freedom of movement has lawfully taken
place, further intrusions should automatically be allowed despite the
absence of a warrant that the Fourth Amendment would otherwise
require."235 "Officer safety" detentions should thus require at least a
basis equivalent to that underlying a valid protective sweep: "a
reasonable belief, based on specific and articulable facts," that the
detained individuals pose a threat.23 6
As former Secretary Chertoff indicated, FOTs detain all
residents they encounter in a home as a matter of course.237 Most
home raids target noncitizen "fugitives" who do not pose a threat to
public safety and do not have a record of violent crime.238 Reasonable
suspicion requires a specific and articulable basis; in Buie, for
example, officers based their concerns on the nature of the crime in
230. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
231. Id. at 762 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968)).
232. 452 U.S. 692 (1981).
233. Buie, 494 U.S. at 334-35 n.2 (citing Summers, 452 U.S. at 701).
234. Summers, 452 U.S. at 701.
235. Buie, 494 U.S. at 336 (quoting Chimel, 395 U.S. at 766-67 n.12).
236. United States v. Maddox, 388 F.3d 1356, 1363 (10th Cir. 2004) (quoting Buie, 494
U.S. at 337).
237. Letter from Michael Chertoff to Senator Christopher Dodd, supra note 17, at 2;
see also CARDOZO IMMIGRATION JUSTICE CLINIC, supra note 11, at 16-17 (citing
lawsuits, suppression motions, and news reports claiming that ICE agents "immediately
detain all occupants" upon entering a home).
238. MIGRATION POLICY INST., supra note 11, at 13.
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question, a multi-person armed robbery.239 Absent a factual basis,
mere recitation of officer safety concerns does not convey "carte
blanche for law enforcement officers to detain any third party, using
any means, as an adjunct to a lawful arrest."2 40 During raids, ICE is
not justified in corralling and interrogating family members, including
children, without any specific and articulable facts sufficient to raise
valid officer safety concerns. Even where officers can initially justify
an "officer safety" detention, they may not lawfully detain occupants
for longer than is necessary to ensure agent safety.241 Detention of
"collateral" arrestees beyond the time it takes to arrest the principal
target would violate the Fourth Amendment.242 Based on distinctions
in established case law, advocates have ample grounds to attack such
detentions.
c. The Validity of Collateral Detentions Under Terry v. Ohio
The government has an alternative basis through which it may
seek to justify collateral detentions: it may argue that they are
justified by Terry v. Ohio,243 which allows brief investigatory stops
supported by a reasonable, articulable suspicion of wrongdoing.24
Terry stops, however, are limited in scope; particularly intrusive
conduct by officers may exceed the lawful bounds of such a stop.245
Advocates may challenge such stops where ICE agents used
239. Buie, 494 U.S. at 327-28.
240. Maddox, 388 F.3d at 1367.
241. In Buie, for example, the protective sweep was upheld because it lasted "no longer
than [was] necessary to dispel the reasonable suspicion of danger and in any event no
longer than it [took] to complete the arrest and depart the premises." 494 U.S. at 335-36;
see also Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 102 (2005) (discussing but not resolving the
respondent's contention that her detention lasted longer than the execution of the search
warrant and was thus unlawful); Maddox, 388 F.3d at 1367 ("[P]rotective detention must
be for officer safety purposes only ... [and] 'the protective detention must be no more
than necessary to protect the officer[s] from harm.' ") (third alteration in original)
(quoting Buie, 494 U.S. at 333).
242. See United States v. Oguns, 921 F.2d 442, 447 (2d Cir. 1990) ("Once police
eliminate the dangers that justify a security sweep-safety of police, destruction of
evidence, escape of criminals-they must, barring other exigencies, leave the residence.
Were this not the rule, searches begun as minor intrusions on domestic privacy would
expand beyond their legitimate purposes. This concern is particularly germane to
government-citizen encounters where, as here, agents subsequently seek the resident's
consent to search his domicile.").
243. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
244. Id. at 21.
245. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 499-500 (1983).
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unnecessary force, restraint, or intimidation, since confinement
beyond the scope of a Terry stop requires probable cause.246
Investigatory stops by immigration officers require "reasonable
suspicion, based on specific articulable facts," that the target is
"engaged in an offense against the United States or is an alien
illegally in the United States." 247 It is not clear whether the presence
of one undocumented immigrant in a house gives officers reason to
suspect that every other resident is in violation of immigration laws;
some courts have made it quite clear they will only accept an
individualized, particularized suspicion, one sufficient to distinguish
"illegal aliens from American citizens and legal aliens." 24 8 A suspect's
foreign name or appearance is not enough.249 Certainly a suspect's
"mere propinquity to others independently suspected of criminal
activity does not, without more, give rise to probable cause ";250 some
courts have found that it does not give rise to reasonable suspicion,
either.251 Even where agents present some basis for believing that one
resident is in violation of an immigration law, they must justify
detaining others through particularized information suggesting that
the others are themselves unlawfully present.
Even with reasonable suspicion, however, Terry only justifies
brief and minor investigative stops; an arrest, whether formal or de
facto, requires probable cause.252 While drawing the line between an
investigatory stop and a de facto arrest may not be easy,253 the courts
of appeals have made it clear that particularly intrusive officer
246. Id. at 496; see also Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 212 (1979) (declining to
apply a balancing test and requiring probable cause for detention not amounting to a
formal arrest).
247. 8 C.F.R. § 287.8(b)(2) (2010) (articulating a standard that parallels the language of
Terry, 392 U.S. at 21).
248. Orhorhaghe v. INS, 38 F.3d 488, 497 (9th Cir. 1994).
249. Id.; see also United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 885-86 (1975)
("[A]pparent Mexican ancestry ... would justify neither a reasonable belief that they were
aliens, nor a reasonable belief that the car concealed other aliens who were illegally in the
country.").
250. See Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91 (1979) (holding that the execution of a
search warrant at a bar did not justify searching a customer who happened to be present).
251. State v. Morris, 72 P.3d 570, 580 (Kan. 2003).
252. United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 691 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring); see
also Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 212 (1979) (requiring probable cause for a de
facto arrest and noting that reasonable suspicion is sufficient only for "intrusions [falling]
far short of the kind of intrusion associated with an arrest").
253. See Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 685 (upholding a twenty-minute detention under the
circumstances and noting that precedent "may in some instances create difficult line-
drawing problems in distinguishing an investigative stop from a de facto arrest").
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conduct may amount to de facto arrest.2 * Courts have set out "no
bright line that distinguishes an investigative detention from an
arrest,"" though courts accept invasive measures, such as handcuffs
or displays of weapons, where officers had reason to believe the
suspect was dangerous.26 The Tenth Circuit, for example, has stated
that handcuffs constitute "a far greater level of intrusion," acceptable
in a Terry stop only if a prudent officer would have reason to think
them appropriate.257 Similarly, weapons may convert a Terry stop into
a full arrest requiring probable cause, unless the circumstances
warrant their use.258 For example, "pointing guns at a suspect may
elevate a seizure to an 'arrest' in most scenarios. "259 The Seventh
Circuit has opined that "it would be a sad day for the people of the
United States if police had carte blanche to point a gun at each and
254. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez-Arias, 2003 FED App. 0336P, [[ 13-16, 344 F.3d
623, 627-28 (6th Cir. 2003) (finding a de facto arrest where police drew weapons in
apprehending drug suspects, and discussing factors for such arrests, including "the
transportation of the detainee to another location, significant restraints on the detainee's
freedom of movement involving physical confinement or other coercion preventing the
detainee from leaving police custody, and the use of weapons or bodily force" (quoting
United States v. Richardson, 949 F.2d 851, 857 (6th Cir. 1991))).
255. Id. at 628.
256. Id.; see also Flowers v. Fiore, 359 F.3d 24, 30 (1st Cir. 2004) (upholding a Terry
stop in which officers drew weapons to approach an apparently armed suspect); United
States v. Hamlin, 319 F.3d 666, 678-82 (4th Cir. 2003) (finding that handcuffing did not
convert stop to an arrest, since defendant had made "repeated attempts to reach toward
his groin area" and said he would not allow search); Gallegos v. City of Los Angeles, 308
F.3d 987, 992 (9th Cir. 2002) (upholding a Terry stop in which officers drew weapons on a
suspected burglar).
257. United States v. Melendez-Garcia, 28 F.3d 1046, 1052 (10th Cir. 1994); see also
United States v. Acosta-Colon, 157 F.3d 9, 18 (1st Cir. 1998) (noting that while handcuffs
may be justified in some Terry stops, police "may [not] handcuff suspects as a matter of
routine"); Washington v. Lambert, 98 F.3d 1181, 1189-90 (9th Cir. 1996) (setting out a test
for circumstances where handcuffing will not convert a Terry stop into an arrest); Baker v.
Monroe Twp., 50 F.3d 1186, 1193 (3d Cir. 1995) (handcuffing unjustified where officer
lacked reason to feel threatened).
258. Baker, 50 F.3d at 1193 (noting that in a Terry stop, "use of guns and handcuffs
must be justified by the circumstances"); see also United States v, Sinclair, 983 F.2d 598,
603 (4th Cir. 1993) (allowing the use of drawn weapons as a "reasonable precaution" given
the circumstances (quoting United States v. Seni, 662 F.2d 277, 283 (4th Cir. 1981)));
United States v. Del Vizo, 918 F.2d 821, 825 (9th Cir. 1990) (finding that drawing a
weapon on a cooperative suspect, forcing him to lie down, and handcuffing him
constituted a de facto arrest); United States v. Ceballos, 654 F.2d 177, 184 (2d Cir. 1981)
(approaching with guns drawn was not a valid Terry stop where suspect was apparently
only a low-level drug trafficker); Commonwealth v. Bottari, 482 N.E.2d 321, 324 (Mass.
1985) (approaching suspects with guns drawn was improper absent specific "fear-
provoking circumstances").
259. United States v. Perdue, 8 F.3d 1455, 1463 (10th Cir. 1993); see also Robinson v.
Solano Cnty., 278 F.3d 1007, 1013-14 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding excessive force in a civil suit
where police pointed a gun at an apparently unarmed misdemeanor suspect).
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every person of whom they had an 'articulable suspicion' of engaging
in criminal activity." 260
The Supreme Court has also placed the burden on the
government to "demonstrate that the seizure it seeks to justify on the
basis of a reasonable suspicion was sufficiently limited in scope and
duration to satisfy the conditions of an investigative seizure." 261 The
Tenth Circuit has suggested that such a burden is not met through a
categorical statement that drug dealers pose a threat to officer
safety.262 ICE agents may not use Terry to justify the use of violent
and threatening conduct against people suspected of nothing more
than civil immigration violations.263
While the boundary between a Terry seizure and a full-fledged
arrest is a fact-specific one, ICE FOTs clearly overstep it during many
home raids. Officers often force entry into homes; they handcuff
residents or tell them to lie down; they shout threats and orders.2 6
Officers sometimes threaten residents by entering with guns drawn.265
In a few cases, officers have held cooperative and unarmed residents
at gunpoint.266 Such tactics, when directed at a non-dangerous and
cooperative resident, are the indicia of a full arrest, not a Terry stop.
Since arrest without probable cause violates the Fourth Amendment,
advocates should seek to suppress evidence stemming from the
unlawful detention of collateral victims of home raids.
B. Warrantless Home Invasions as Inherently Egregious
The Lopez-Mendoza Court dealt with "the exclusion of credible
evidence gathered in connection with peaceful arrests by INS
officers;" 267 eight Justices left open the possibility of suppressing
260. United States v. Serna-Barreto, 842 F.2d 965, 967 (7th Cir. 1988).
261. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983).
262. Melendez-Garcia, 28 F.3d at 1052-53; see also Ceballos, 654 F.2d at 184 (holding
"generalization" that drug traffickers are violent "insufficient to justify the extensive
intrusion" of approaching suspect with guns drawn under the Terry rubric).
263. See MIGRATION POLICY INST., supra note 11, at 7 (noting that most FOT
arrestees have no record of criminal convictions).
264. See, e.g., CARDOZO IMMIGRATION JUSTICE CLINIC, supra note 11, at 21-22
(citing In re M-, slip op. (S.F. Immigr. Ct., Aug. 16, 2007) (noting that officers forced their
way into a residence and handcuffed a pregnant woman to a chair during a raid));
Nicodemus, supra note 115 (reporting that agents broke into residence with guns drawn
and ordered residents to lie down).
265. NAT'L COMM'N ON ICE MISCONDUCT & VIOLATIONS OF 4TH AMENDMENT
RIGHTS, supra note 30, at 49 (providing testimony of New Haven Mayor John DeStefano,
Jr., concerning ICE raids in his community).
266. See, e.g., First Amended Complaint, supra note 1, at 11-12.
267. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1051 (1984) (O'Connor, J., plurality
opinion).
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evidence obtained through "egregious violations of Fourth
Amendment or other liberties.'"26 Justice O'Connor's brief treatment
of this exception suggests that warrantless entries into the home may
constitute egregious violations.2 69 Two courts of appeals later set out
guidance as to the scope of the exception: the Ninth Circuit has held
warrantless home invasions to be egregious per se, and the Second
Circuit's standards for egregiousness should reach conduct common
in Fugitive Operations raids.270 More importantly, the origins and
contemporary interpretation of the Fourth Amendment show that the
home enjoys a unique status in the American law of search and
seizure. 27 1 Respect for this status compels application of the
exclusionary rule for Fourth Amendment violations in the home.272
1. The Lopez-Mendoza Exception for "Egregious Violations of the
Fourth Amendment"
The Supreme Court has not defined the scope of Lopez-
Mendoza's exception for "egregious violations of the Fourth
268. Id. at 1050; see also supra Part I.C (discussing dissents supporting the exclusionary
rule in immigration proceedings).
269. See discussion infra Part II.B.1.
270. See infra Part II.B.2.
271. See, e.g., Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961).
272. See infra Part II.B.3. This section focuses on the argument that any warrantless
home invasion, without consent or exigent circumstances, constitutes an egregious
violation of the Fourth Amendment, given the weighty protection that residences enjoy in
American privacy jurisprudence. The argument this Article makes is, at its core, a
historical one: violations in the home are egregious in that they offend a core value of the
Fourth Amendment. See infra Part II.B.3. While there is little case law distinguishing
egregious constitutional violations from lesser violations, see infra note 287, the decisions
available suggest that one important consideration is the extent to which the officers knew
or should have known that their conduct was unconstitutional. See Gonzalez-Rivera v.
INS, 22 F.3d 1441, 1449 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting Adamson v. Comm'r, 745 F.2d 541, 545
(9th Cir. 1994)) (defining egregious violations to include "deliberate violations of the
fourth amendment, or ... conduct a reasonable officer should have known is in violation of
the Constitution"); In re Toro, 17 I. & N. Dec. 340, 343-44 (B.I.A. 1980) (allowing
evidence because the officers acted in good faith). History and text can resolve such an
inquiry: the home is the subject of such longstanding and unambiguous constitutional
protection that no officer can claim that he or she engaged in a warrantless home raid
reasonably and in good faith. See Lopez-Rodriguez v. Mukasey, 536 F.3d 1012, 1018 (9th
Cir. 2008).
While advocates are certainly justified in calling for a categorical rule that
violations of the warrant clause in home raids are inherently egregious in light of the status
the home enjoys, advocates should still underscore any facts showing the severity of a
particular raid-say, racial bias, unnecessarily prolonged detention, or the use of force or
threats. See Almeida-Amaral v. Gonzalez, 461 F.3d 231, 235-37 (2d Cir. 2006) (discussing
factors which may show egregiousness). Unlawful searches may also violate ICE
regulations; evidence obtained through violations may be suppressible on independent
grounds not requiring any inquiry into egregiousness. See infra Part IV.
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Amendment."2 73 Instead, the concurring Justices cited in a footnote
two examples of evidence the Board of Immigration Appeals
("BIA") suppressed for egregious violations: an "admission of
alienage obtained after [requests] for counsel had been repeatedly
refused,"274 and "evidence obtained as a result of a night-time
warrantless entry into the aliens' residence." 27 The latter case, In re
Ramira-Cordova, is unpublished, but the Department of Justice also
raised In re Ramira-Cordova in its submission to the Court as an
example of the BIA's approach.2 76 In doing so, the Department of
Justice commended the BIA's decision as "a balanced response to the
problem of Fourth Amendment violations committed by INS
officers." 277
The concurring Justices in Lopez-Mendoza likewise cited Rochin
v. California, 27 a criminal case preceding the full development of the
exclusionary rule.279 In Rochin, the Court suppressed morphine pills
officers had obtained through a "conscience-shocking" due process
violation: a forced, warrantless home entry followed by physical
abuse and induced vomiting.280 As lower courts have acknowledged,
the citation to Rochin was not intended to limit the exception to gross
physical abuse. 28 1 The concurring Justices cited without comment two
BIA decisions suppressing evidence for conduct falling far short of
the physical abuse in Rochin.282 They described the exception as
"egregious violations of the Fourth Amendment or other liberties," 283
a phrase that would be clumsy if intended only to reach conduct of
the sort in Rochin, which centered on the Due Process Clause and not
273. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1050 (1984) (O'Connor, J., plurality
opinion).
274. Id. at 1051 n.5 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion) (citing In re Garcia, 17 I. & N.
Dec. 319, 321 (B.I.A. 1980)).
275. Id. (citing In re Ramira-Cordova, No. A21 095 659 (B.I.A. Feb. 21, 1980)).
276. Brief for the Petitioner, Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (No. 83-491), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/osg/briefs/1983/sg830057.txt.
277. Id.
278. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
279. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1051 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion) (citing Rochin,
342 U.S. at 172).
280. Rochin, 342 U.S. at 172.
281. See, e.g., Gonzalez-Rivera v. INS, 22 F.3d 1441, 1449 (9th Cir. 1994); see also
Almeida-Amaral v. Gonzalez, 461 F.3d 231, 235 (2d Cir. 2006) (suggesting evidence
suppressible for, inter alia, arrests predicated upon racial profiling).
282. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1051 n.5 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion) (citing In
re Ramira-Cordova, No. A21 095 659 (B.I.A. Feb. 21, 1980) (suppressing evidence
obtained in a home raid); In re Garcia, 17 I. & N. Dec. 319, 321 (B.I.A. 1980) (suppressing
an admission of alienage obtained after request for counsel had been repeatedly refused)).
283. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1050.
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the Fourth Amendment. 284 The concurring Justices thus suggested
that the exception went beyond physical abuse, and the task of
fleshing out its parameters fell to the courts of appeals.
2. The "Egregious Violations" Exception in the Courts of Appeals
Only two circuits have set out clear standards for assessing
whether a constitutional violation rises to the level of
egregiousness.285 Most of the other circuits have raised and disposed
of claims of egregiousness without setting out a standard.286 Under the
interpretations adopted in the Second and Ninth Circuits, warrantless
home entries should be considered egregious per se, and the
unnecessary violence that FOTs employ certainly should show
egregious violations in many home raids.287
a. Warrantless Home Invasions as Egregious Under the Ninth
Circuit's "Bad Faith" Approach
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has found that
warrantless home invasions constitute egregious violations. The court
of appeals defined as egregious any "deliberate violations of the
Fourth Amendment" and any actions "a reasonable officer should
know" violate the Constitution.28 The Ninth Circuit noted that "the
Lopez-Mendoza court's citation to Rochin was [not] meant to limit
284. See Rochin, 342 U.S. at 172.
285. See Almeida-Amaral, 461 F.3d at 235-37; Gonzalez-Rivera, 22 F.3d at 1448-52.
286. See, e.g., Gonzalez-Reyes v. Holder, No. 07-60203, 2009 WL 484246, at *54 (5th
Cir. Feb. 26, 2009) (holding that repeated questioning in a raised voice does not rise to the
level of egregiousness); Kandamar v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 65, 74 (1st Cir. 2006) (refusing to
find egregiousness); United States v. Olivares-Rangel, 458 F.3d 1104, 1118 n.11 (10th Cir.
2006) (citing the Lopez-Mendoza examples of egregiousness, including "a night-time
warrantless entry into the aliens' residence"); United States v. Bowley, 435 F.3d 426, 430-
31 (3d Cir. 2006) (referencing the examples in Lopez-Mendoza); United States v. Navarro-
Diaz, 2005 FED App. 0351P, 1 21-23, 420 F.3d 581, 587 (6th Cir. 2005) (same);
Rampasard v. U.S. Att'y Gen., No. 04-15038, 2005 WL 2045029, at *1 (11th Cir. Aug. 26,
2005) (per curiam) (finding that allegations of interrogation did not support a finding of
egregiousness); Navarro-Chalan v. Ashcroft, 359 F.3d 19, 23 (1st Cir. 2004) (refusing to
find egregiousness for voluntary statements made while not in custody); Martinez-
Camargo v. INS, 282 F.3d 487, 493 (7th Cir. 2002) (ruling without reaching the question of
egregiousness).
287. See, e.g., sources cited supra notes 52, 115.
288. Gonzalez-Rivera v. INS, 22 F.3d 1441, 1448 (9th Cir. 1994). This approach focuses
on whether the violations were good faith errors or bad faith violations of clear
constitutional norms; the "good faith" approach has not been adopted by other circuits.
See, e.g., Melnitsenko v. Mukasey, 517 F.3d 42, 47-48 (2d Cir. 2008) (emphasizing the
"severity" of the violation, rather than the officers' intentions). As the next sections will
discuss, courts should consider home raids egregious violations under either standard.
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'egregious violations' to those of physical brutality."28 9 The court of
appeals addressed home raids in particular in Lopez-Rodriguez v.
Mukasey,290 finding that a peaceful but warrantless home entry
constituted an egregious Fourth Amendment violation: "Few
principles in criminal procedure are as well established as the maxim
that 'the Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm line at the entrance to
the house. Absent exigent circumstances, that threshold may not
reasonably be crossed without a warrant.' "291
b. Warrantless Home Invasions as Egregious Under Second
Circuit Precedent
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has set out different
principles in assessing egregiousness, and while it has not ruled on a
home invasion case, its standards for egregiousness ought to
encompass warrantless home raids. The Second Circuit's principles
have focused on arrests, rather than searches, holding in one case that
"the egregiousness of a constitutional violation cannot be gauged
solely on the basis of the validity (or invalidity) of the stop, but must
also be based on the characteristics and severity of the offending
conduct." 2" Almeida-Amaral v. Gonzalez293 focused on an outdoor
stop allegedly predicated upon racial profiling.294 The court alluded to
the Ninth Circuit's rule that a stop based on race ("or some other
grossly improper consideration") would amount to an egregious
Fourth Amendment violation.295  Absent such an improper
motivation, a stop might constitute an egregious violation in light of
the conduct's "severity," that is, whether it is "gross or unreasonable
... e.g., when the initial stop is particularly lengthy, there is a show or
use of force, etc."296 The Second Circuit cautioned: "[W]e do not
intend to give an exhaustive list of what might constitute an egregious
violation of an individual's rights. We emphasize these principles only
because they are especially germane to the facts and circumstances of
the case before us." 297 To date, the Second Circuit has not announced
289. Gonzalez-Rivera, 22 F.3d at 1449 (quoting Adamson v. Comm'r, 745 F.2d 541, 545
n.1 (9th Cir. 1984)).
290. 536 F.3d 1012 (9th Cir. 2008).
291. Id. at 1018 (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980)).
292. Almeida-Amaral v. Gonzalez, 461 F.3d 231, 235 (2d Cir. 2006).
293. 461 F.3d 231 (2d Cir. 2006).
294. Id. at 232, 237.
295. Id. at 235.
296. Id. at 235-36; see also Melnitsenko v. Mukasey, 517 F.3d 42, 47-48 (2d Cir. 2008)
(focusing on the "severity" of a stop).
297. Almeida-Amaral, 461 F.3d at 235 n.1.
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whether the same principles apply to searches in the home as opposed
to seizures in public.
While advocates can and should emphasize the case-specific
severity of intrusions into client homes-the use of force or
intimidation, for example-there is also room to argue that home
invasions are inherently severe violations. American law has always
borne out such a conclusion.2 9 8 In Almeida-Amaral, one of the
possible indices of severity was a lengthy, suspicionless stop.299 While
such an encounter may no doubt be a significant deprivation of rights,
a home raid is certainly more severe in constitutional terms: the
security of the home is central to the Fourth Amendment.3 " If the
examples in Almeida-Amaral are any guide, nonconsensual home
entries qualify as egregious violations.
3. The "Chief Evil" Prohibited by the Fourth Amendment:
Warrantless Home Invasions in Historical Context
As the Supreme Court has long emphasized, protection of the
home is at the core of the Fourth Amendment.3 0' Warrantless,
unjustified home invasions therefore necessarily constitute an
egregious violation of the Amendment. Accordingly, the Supreme
Court has "jealously and carefully drawn" exceptions to the warrant
requirement.3 " It has long seen strict adherence to the warrant
procedure as required in order to "[minimize] the danger of needless
intrusions."303 The Court has consistently emphasized the objective
severity of home invasions in spite of significant changes to the
Court's perspective on the nature of other Fourth Amendment
protections." The warrantless home raid is the paradigmatic Fourth
Amendment violation, the "chief evil against which the wording of
the Fourth Amendment is directed." 305 Such invasions not only
298. See infra Part II.B.3.
299. 461 F.3d at 236.
300. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585-86 (1980).
301. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961).
302. Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499 (1958); see also Kyllo v. United States,
533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001) ("With few exceptions, the question whether a warrantless search of
a home is reasonable and hence constitutional must be answered no.").
303. Payton, 445 U.S. at 585-86.
304. See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 582 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(discussing the erosion of the warrant requirement from the 1960s onward and citing a
catalog of emerging exceptions); see also Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 31 (noting that warrantless
searches of the home are unreasonable with "few exceptions").
305. United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972); see also
Silverman, 365 U.S. at 511 ("The Fourth Amendment, and the personal rights which it
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prompted the adoption of the Amendment, they were a major trigger
in the American Revolution.3 06 The sanctity of the home and the
necessity of the warrant procedure are bedrock constitutional
principles. If a warrantless home raid is not an egregious search, it is
difficult to imagine what is.
a. Home Raids in Supreme Court Precedent: The Archetypal
Fourth Amendment Violation
In Payton v. New York," which imposed the warrant
requirement on in-home arrests, Justice Stevens noted: "[F]reedom
from intrusion into the home or dwelling is the archetype of the
privacy protection secured by the Fourth Amendment."308 The
Supreme Court has called warrantless house searches "abhorrent to
our laws."309 For more than a century, the Court has denounced them
as violations of the "indefeasible right of personal security."310 The
Payton Court summarized this principle: "The Fourth Amendment
protects the individual's privacy in a variety of settings. In none is the
zone of privacy more clearly defined than when bounded by the
unambiguous physical dimensions of an individual's home-a zone
that finds its roots in clear and specific constitutional terms."311
The Supreme Court has repeatedly used the "special protection"
of the home to distinguish other searches seen as less intrusive.312
When the Burger Court upheld Environmental Protection Agency
aerial surveillance of a Dow Chemical plant it stated: "The intimate
activities associated with family privacy and the home and its
curtilage simply do not reach the outdoor areas or spaces between
secures, have a long history. At the very core stands the right of a man to retreat into his
own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.").
306. See infra Part II.B.3.b.
307. 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
308. Id. at 587 (quoting Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d 385, 389 (D.C. Cir. 1970)
(en banc)).
309. Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 32 (1925).
310. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886); see also Kyllo v. United States,
533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001) (citing Silverman, 365 U.S. at 511) (noting that protection of the
home lies at the "core" of the Amendment); Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287, 296-97
(1984) (Powell, J., plurality opinion) ("[P]rivacy interests are especially strong in a private
residence"); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 453 (1948) (noting that the Fourth
Amendment and warrant requirement "mark[] the right of privacy as one of the unique
values of our civilization").
311. 445 U.S. at 589.
312. See, e.g., Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 810 (1984); Welsh v. Wisconsin,
466 U.S. 740, 754 (1984); Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 531 (1967); Wong Sun v.
United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484 (1963).
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structures and buildings of a manufacturing plant."313 The line of
cases that reduced the Fourth Amendment protection of businesses
and automobiles did so by distinguishing them from dwellings.314
In contrast to the limited protection it gives to businesses or
vehicles, the Fourth Amendment prohibits essentially any intrusion of
the home absent a warrant or exigent circumstances. The Supreme
Court has best illustrated this principle in its willingness to suppress
evidence following de minimis in-home searches. It is well-settled that
technical trespass on the home may work an unreasonable search.315
But the Supreme Court has also suppressed evidence obtained
through the use of passive imaging technology that does not involve
any physical contact with the home." In Kyllo, the Court suppressed
images that showed nothing more than the relative temperature of
different parts of a house, used to identify heat lamps used in
marijuana cultivation.3 17 As Justice Scalia put it, "[I]n the home, our
cases show, all details are intimate details, because the entire area is
held safe from prying government eyes." 1 In Arizona v. Hicks,"' the
Court suppressed evidence obtained in what it termed a "dwelling-
place search," in which officers lawfully present in the home
conducted a cursory inspection of the bottom of a turntable.320
The warrant requirement is procedural in nature, but that does
not diminish its significance. In requiring judicial authorization, the
Supreme Court has said:
We are not dealing with formalities. The presence of a search
warrant serves a high function. Absent some grave emergency,
the Fourth Amendment has interposed a magistrate between
the citizen and the police. This was done not to shield criminals
.... The right of privacy was deemed too precious to entrust to
the discretion of those whose job is the detection of crime and
the arrest of criminals.32'
313. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 236 (1986).
314. See, e.g., Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974) (Blackmun, J., plurality
opinion) (distinguishing building searches); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 48 (1970)
(noting that weaker warrant protections attach to automobiles as compared to houses).
315. See Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961) (prohibiting any physical
intrusion "by even a fraction of an inch").
316. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001).
317. Id. at 35.
318. Id. at 37.
319. 480 U.S. 321 (1987).
320. Id. at 328; id. at 333 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (characterizing the actions of the
police as a reasonable "cursory inspection").
321. McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455-56 (1948).
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The Supreme Court's unwillingness to countenance warrantless
home invasions has driven many of the expansions of Fourth
Amendment protections. Rochin v. California3 22 ended in physical
abuse "that shock[ed] the conscience," but it began with a warrantless
home entry.3 23 The Supreme Court first applied the exclusionary rule
in the home raid case, Weeks v. United States.324 It broadened the
exclusionary rule's reach to state proceedings in Mapp v. Ohio,325 in
which police entered the suspect's home apparently using a fake
warrant.326 Court cases protecting the home also show some rare
alliances: Justice Scalia wrote the majority opinions in Hicks and
Kyllo, and Justice Thomas joined him in the latter along with Justices
Breyer, Ginsburg, and Souter.327 If Fourth Amendment disputes in
general show a divide between liberal and conservative thinkers,
Justices in both camps place a great deal of emphasis on protecting
the home.328
The reach of the warrant requirement outside of the home has
waned under the Burger, Rehnquist, and Roberts Courts.3 29 As Hicks
and Kyllo show, though, the special status of the home has weathered
momentous changes in the interpretation of the Fourth Amendment.
As the Court has made abidingly clear, where agents kick down a
suspect's front door,330 they violate " 'the conception of human rights
enshrined in [our] history' and Constitution." 3 1 Such an intrusion
must amount to an egregious violation of the Fourth Amendment.
322. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
323. Id. at 172.
324. 232 U.S. 383, 393-94 (1914) (requiring the exclusion of evidence obtained by
warrantless house searches by federal agents).
325. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
326. Id. at 645.
327. Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 322 (1987); Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 27
(2001).
328. See, e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 474-75 (1971) ("Both sides to
the controversy [over the warrant requirement] appear to recognize a distinction between
searches and seizures that take place on a man's property-his home or office-and those
carried out elsewhere. It is accepted, at least as a matter of principle, that a search or
seizure carried out on a suspect's premises without a warrant is per se unreasonable, ...
[absent] 'exigent circumstances.' ").
329. See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 582 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(discussing the proliferation of "exceptions" to the warrant requirement since the 1960s).
330. See supra notes 25-58.
331. Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 620 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting
Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 28 (1949)).
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b. Fugitive Operations and the Roots of the Fourth Amendment
The emphasis that courts place on protecting the home reflects
the roots of the Fourth Amendment, both in the common law and the
conditions that precipitated the American Revolution. The Colonial
anger leading up to the Revolution was driven in significant part by
searches and seizures by customs officials acting pursuant to "writs of
assistance." 332 In the view of many colonists, the authority of the
customs agent rose to "petty tyranny" because it interfered with
rights sacrosanct in Anglo-American law: "That a man's house was
his castle was one of the most essential branches of English liberty, a
privilege totally annihilated by" the use of general warrants.333
English law's focus on the protection of the home had deep historical
roots. Edward Coke, " 'as the greatest authority of his time on the
laws of England,' "3 was one of many scholars to argue that the
common law prohibited warrantless in-home arrests.335 The maxim
that "a man's house is his castle" is often attributed to Coke;
Professor Nelson Lasson, however, traces connections to Roman law
and before: "Cicero expressed the general feeling in this matter when
he said in one of his orations: 'What is more inviolable, what better
defended by religion than the house of a citizen.... This place of
refuge is so sacred to all men, that to be dragged from thence is
unlawful.' "3
Against the backdrop of the common law, American colonists-
and, later, Americans-objected to unfettered searches, whether
supported by general warrants or no warrant at all. In 1774, the
Continental Congress challenged the power of customs agents "to
break open and enter houses, without the authority of any civil
332. LASSON, supra note 66, at 51.
333. Id. at 60; see also Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 596-97 (1980) ("[I]n England
and in the Colonies 'the freedom of one's house' was one of the most vital elements of
English liberty.").
334. Payton, 445 U.S. at 594 n.36 (quoting A. HOWARD, THE ROAD FROM
RUNNYMEDE 118-19 (1968)).
335. Id. at 593-95 (citing various early English commentators). In Payton, Justice
Stevens quoted Edward Coke: "[N]either the Constable, nor any other can break open
any house for the apprehension of the party suspected or charged with the felony." Id. at
594 n.37 (quoting 4 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 177 (1644)).
336. LASSON, supra note 66, at 15. William Cuddihy discusses the history of the maxim
from its Roman origins through its role in the formation of the Fourth Amendment.
CUDDIHY, supra note 68, at lix-lxvii. By 1760, the "castle" trope connoted not just
personal privacy but a limitation on government action; a public consensus had emerged
that treated house searches not authorized by specific warrants as a violation of privacy
rights. Id. at lxiv.
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magistrate."337 This attitude outlasted the Revolution: years later, the
specter of colonial-era home invasions drove the adoption of the
Fourth Amendment. During the Constitutional Convention,
Antifederalists and others objected to the proposed document's lack
of safeguards."3 As Patrick Henry put it during Virginia's ratifying
convention, "When these harpies are aided by excisemen, who may
search, at any time, your houses and most secret recesses, will the
people bear it?"" Henry followed his speech several days later with
the introduction of a prohibition on general warrants; that provision
grew into the broader Fourth Amendment.340 Its quick uptake
reflected the consensus, in the years around the Revolution, that
unchecked authority to search posed a significant threat to liberty."
Essayists of the day included warrantless searches in their concerns,
analogizing them to the pre-Revolution "general warrant" searches
that had so antagonized the colonists.342 Just as the practice of
unjustified home invasions helped prompt the Revolution, the fear of
such intrusions was the central motivation behind the adoption of the
Fourth Amendment. The archetypal Fourth Amendment violation,343
a warrantless home raid, is inherently egregious.
4. The Benefits of a Per Se Rule Governing Home Invasions
The Lopez-Mendoza Court raised a number of policy objections
to applying the exclusionary rule to immigration proceedings.344
Should judges raise such concerns against advocates arguing for a rule
that warrantless home raids are per se egregious, advocates can
readily distinguish raid cases on policy grounds. The Lopez-Mendoza
majority based its holding in part on a belief that applying the
exclusionary rule would be a weak deterrent given the infrequent use
of motions to suppress in immigration proceedings.3 45 But a clear-cut
rule focused on a particular and highly prevalent type of violation
337. CUDDIHY, supra note 68, at 779; LASSON, supra note 66, at 75.
338. CUDDIHY, supra note 68, at 674 (noting that Antifederalist authors "predicted
that general warrants, writs of assistance, and general excise searches without warrant
would be among the consequences of ratification" of the proposed Constitution).
339. LASSON, supra note 66, at 92.
340. Id. at 95-96; see also Payton, 445 U.S. at 583-585 (discussing the history of the
provision).
341. CUDDIHY, supra note 68, at lix-lxviii.
342. Id. at 780-81.
343. See id. at 781 (describing the early national "consensus against promiscuous,
warrantless house searches" that furnished the constitutional mandate against
unreasonable searches).
344. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1043-45 (1984).
345. Id. at 1044.
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could have much greater deterrent effect, forcing ICE to move away
from home raid tactics at odds with the Constitution. The Lopez-
Mendoza Court emphasized the record-keeping problems associated
with adjudicating suppression in workplace raids: such "arrests occur
in crowded and confused circumstances."3 46 In contrast, home raids
may be more easily tracked. ICE agents are already required to
record the circumstances of any home entry, including the name of
any person who consents to such entry.3 47 The record will also show
whether the agents obtained a warrant, and, if so, upon what evidence
the magistrate granted it.3' Courts will thus automatically have
evidence as to the two most important factual questions in assessing
the legality of a home entry: the presence of a warrant and the
presence of consent. Given the relative ease and deterrent value of
suppression in the home raid context, advocates can show that home
raids present a very different picture than the types of enforcement
contemplated in Lopez-Mendoza.
Courts must closely scrutinize intrusions into the home, as such
intrusions are considered the "chief evil" restricted by the Fourth
Amendment. Absent a warrant or exigent circumstances, even the
slightest such intrusion is illegal. The frightening methods ICE
employs in home raids underscore the extent to which any home
invasion impairs a basic human right.3 49 Advocates in the Ninth
Circuit have already succeeded in establishing that warrantless home
raids constitute an "egregious violation."350 The Supreme Court has
suggested such a result, both in Lopez-Mendoza itself and through
the long constitutional emphasis on the sanctity of the home.351 As an
enforcement method radically inconsistent with American law, ICE
346. Id. at 1049.
347. 8 C.F.R. § 287.8(f)(2) (2010). Thanks to Peter Markowitz and Jaya Vasandani for
directing my attention to this provision.
348. Id.
349. See, e.g., First Amended Complaint, supra note 1, at 11-13 (alleging that agents
held a cooperative suspect at gunpoint); id. at 17-19 (alleging agents threatened to "gas" a
suspect's house if she did not accede to warrantless entry); id. at 9 (alleging that an agent
"had his hand on his gun as if he was ready to take it out at any minute" when dealing with
an unaccompanied fifteen-year-old citizen in another raid); CARDOZO IMMIGRATION
JUSTICE CLINIC, supra note 11, at 17 (reporting that agents threatened to kick down a
suspect's front door in one raid); see also Hudson v. Michigan., 547 U.S. 586. 620 (2006)
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that home invasions violate the " 'conception of human
rights enshrined in [our] history' and Constitution" (quoting Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S.
25, 28 (1949))); Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc.
AIRES/217(III), at art. 12 (Dec. 10, 1948) ("[N]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary
interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence").
350. See supra Part II.B.2.a.
351. See supra Part II.B.3.
555
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
home raids are ripe for challenge as inherently egregious violations of
the Fourth Amendment.
III. WIDESPREAD AND SYSTEMATIC CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS
DURING ICE HOME RAIDS JUSTIFY REVISITING THE HOLDING IN
LOPEZ-MENDOZA
The Lopez-Mendoza Court conditioned its holding on the
premise that Fourth Amendment violations were not widespread in
interior immigration enforcement and that the government had
"already taken sensible and reasonable steps to deter Fourth
Amendment violations by its officers."352 Of the five Justices
unwilling to apply the exclusionary rule, four cautioned: "Our
conclusions concerning the exclusionary rule's value might change if
there developed good reason to believe that Fourth Amendment
violations by INS officers were widespread."35 3 As other
commentators have argued, ICE now engages in widespread and
unchecked misconduct; this predicate of the Lopez-Mendoza holding
has so eroded as to justify suppression for any Fourth Amendment
violations.354 ICE home raids present a particularly clear picture,
given the frequency of warrantless entries by FOTs.355 Lopez-
Mendoza depended upon the assumption that Fourth Amendment
violations by the INS were infrequent, unplanned, and adequately
redressed. Present-day home raids include widespread, systematic,
and severe violations of constitutional rights.356 These violations arise
in large part from ICE policy, in particular its lapses in training and
supervision, not from the misconduct or mistakes of individual
officers.357 Accordingly, advocates should argue that contemporary
ICE practices justify more judicial scrutiny of home raids in
particular, whether or not courts are ready to revisit Lopez-Mendoza
in general.
A. "Widespread Violations," Before and After Lopez-Mendoza
A recent article by Stella Burch Elias, a Harvard lecturer, casts
light on the assumptions that underpinned Lopez-Mendoza and
shows that ICE misconduct has eroded the factual basis for that
352. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1050 (1984).
353. Id. at 1050 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion).
354. See supra notes 11, 14.
355. See infra Part III.A.
356. See infra Part III.A.
357. See infra Part III.B.
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decision.358 Drawing on the conference notes of Justice Blackmun,
seen at the time as the "fifth vote" that consolidated the Lopez-
Mendoza majority,3 59 Elias notes that the Court saw the availability of
other putative deterrents-INS rules, procedures, and training aimed
at preventing rights violations-as "perhaps the most important
reason for" limiting evidentiary suppression in removal
proceedings.3" The Court found that the INS had "its own
comprehensive scheme for deterring Fourth Amendment violations
by its officers."3 61
[T]he INS has developed rules restricting stop, interrogation
and arrest practices. These regulations require that no one be
detained without reasonable suspicion of illegal alienage, and
that no one be arrested unless there is an admission of illegal
alienage or other strong evidence thereof. New immigration
officers receive instruction and examination in Fourth
Amendment law, and others receive periodic refresher courses
in law.362
At least some on the Court believed these measures were
effective. Justice Blackmun argued, before the Court granted
certiorari, that violations by INS officers were not widespread enough
to justify hearing the case.3 63 "Chief Justice Burger believed that INS
was 'better than most police departments' at preventing constitutional
violations from occurring."3 6 The final opinion noted that motions to
suppress were rarely made and rarely granted in removal
proceedings.365
358. Elias, supra note 12, passim.
359. Id. at 1121 n.59 (noting that Justice Blackmun's clerk wrote at the time that
Justice O'Connor circulated a draft to Justice Blackmun because she saw him as the
" 'fifth vote and she wants to nail down her Court' " (quoting Memorandum from Anna
Durand, law clerk, to Justice Harry Blackmun 407/83-491 (May 23, 1984) (on file with
Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington,
D.C.))).
360. Id. at 1122.
361. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1044 (1984).
362. Id. at 1044-45 (citation omitted).
363. See Elias, supra note 12, at 1111.
364. Id. at 1122 (quoting Justice Harry Blackmun, Conference Notes, 407/83-491
(April 20, 1984) (on file with Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of
Congress, Washington, D.C.)). Justice O'Connor kept the language over Justice Burger's
objections; as such, that passage of her decision is a four-justice opinion, though four
dissenting justices supported applying the exclusionary rule in immigration proceedings,
with or without evidence of widespread violations. See id.; Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at
1033-34, 1051-52, 1060-61.
365. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1044.
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Whatever their value at the time of Lopez-Mendoza, these
deterrent measures have failed to prevent the abuses that now
pervade interior immigration enforcement. As Elias points out,
constitutional violations during raids have become a nationwide
problem: her work cites press reports, civil complaints, and public
hearings alleging violations in more than twenty states.366 Noncitizens
in removal proceedings are not guaranteed attorneys and often
cannot afford them; many defend themselves from jail.367 Under such
conditions, it is likely that many violations go unnoticed and
unreported; thus, the violations actually litigated reflect "the tip of
the iceberg.""
Elias's article presents a useful road map for claims under the
"widespread violations exception."3 69 This Article will not retread the
same issues, but will add a narrower and additional claim: the
widespread violations in home raids in particular justify
reconsideration of the exclusionary rule in that context. Recent
history suggests that violations in the home are disproportionately
frequent and severe. For instance, a recent report by the United
Nations Human Rights Council Special Rapporteur on the human
rights of migrants criticized the increasing use of "forceful" and
warrantless house sweeps, citing an incident in which two young
children awoke to find officers arresting their parents.3 70 Another
report, sponsored by labor unions and civil rights organizations,
discussed similar abuses: officers entering "with guns drawn," rousing
sleeping residents. 71  Home raids have prompted lawsuits
nationwide.372 They have also elicited a substantial outcry from
elected officials, angered both by the illegality of warrantless entries
and by the lack of respect ICE has shown immigrant communities.373
In one congressional hearing, Rep. Lynn Woolsey testified that ICE
366. See Elias, supra note 12, at 1129-33.
367. See id. at 1134-35.
368. Id. at 1135 (quoting Ward, supra note 176, at 50).
369. Id. at 1116.
370. Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants, Addendum: Mission to the
United States ofAmerica, 65-66, Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/7/12/Add.2
(Mar. 5, 2008) (by Jorge Bustamante).
371. NAT'L COMM'N ON ICE MISCONDUCr & VIOLATIONS OF 4TH AMENDMENT
RIGHTS, supra note 30, at 49 (citing the testimony of John DeStefano, Jr., Mayor, New
Haven, Conn.).
372. See, e.g., Complaint, supra note 41, at 2; MIGRATION POLICY INST., supra note 11,
at 24; Elias, supra note 12, at 1132; Bernstein, supra note 45; Moore, supra note 40.
373. See, e.g., Oremus, supra note 14; Letter from Senator Kirstin Gillibrand to Janet
Napolitano, supra note 14; Letter from Senator Joseph Lieberman et al. to Michael
Chertoff, supra note 14; Letter from Thomas Suozzi to Michael Chertoff, supra note 14.
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had yet to develop policies to protect the children, often citizens, of
those arrested in home raids. She stated: "[A] constituent of mine,
Katherine Gibney, the Principal at the San Pedro Elementary School
in San Rafael, testified about how school officials cared for frightened
students during last year's raids and rode the buses to make sure
students didn't return to empty homes." 374
At least one immigration judge has found that ICE's conduct
amounts to widespread constitutional violations. In suppressing
evidence of alienage used against two brothers arrested in a raid of
their shared apartment, Immigration Judge Philip Morace found that
"their case is part of a widespread practice of warrantless and
consentless home raids by ICE agents, resulting in Fourth
Amendment violations."3 75 The court rested its conclusion that
violations were now "not uncommon" on a number of exhibits the
respondents submitted, including the Cardozo Immigration Justice
Clinic's report and news articles discussing ICE's tactics.7 6
Even leaving aside other unconstitutional practices in interior
immigration enforcement, home raids alone reflect a widespread and
severe pattern of misconduct. Whether or not the Lopez-Mendoza
Court was correct that violations were infrequent in the 1980s, during
recent years, one major plank of ICE's interior enforcement efforts
has depended on routine violations of a core constitutional guarantee.
B. ICE Policy Demonstrates Malign Neglect of Fourth Amendment
Rights
Lopez-Mendoza suggested that constitutional violations in
immigration enforcement were typically the accidental byproducts of
crowded, confusing, mass-arrest operations.377 In a workplace raid
affecting hundreds, one could argue, it is likely that officers will take
at least one person aside for questioning without reasonable
suspicion. Suppression may be more difficult to justify if violations
reflect occasional, accidental departures from agency policy.78 More
than two decades later, though, constitutional violations cannot be
considered deviations from typical ICE practice; the conduct of home
374. Immigration Raids-Postville and Beyond: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on
Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border Sec., and Int'l Law of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 110th Cong. 20 (2008) (testimony of Rep. Lynn Woolsey).
375. In re R-C- and J-C-, slip op. at 16-17 (N.Y.C. Immigr. Ct., May 12, 2010).
376. Id. at 2-3, 11 n.6.
377. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1044-45 (1984).
378. Cf id. at 1050-51 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion) (suggesting suppression might
be justified should violations become widespread).
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raids shows a degree of official lawlessness that the Lopez-Mendoza
Court did not foresee.379 The agency's practices have deteriorated to
an extent that undercuts the assumptions of the Court and
underscores the deterrent value of evidentiary suppression.
Institutional safeguards against constitutional rights violations
steadily weakened in the years following Lopez-Mendoza. Within two
years of Lopez-Mendoza, a federal court found "an 'evident
systematic policy and practice of fourth amendment violations' by
INS."' Recent experience suggests that the agency's own training
procedures, the principal safeguard the Lopez-Mendoza Court
discussed,381 no longer adequately address Fourth Amendment
concerns. Elias cites an instance in which an ICE agent told one
resident that officials could enter a private home without a warrant.3 82
A report by the Migration Policy Institute specifically cites deficient
training of FOTs-for example, ICE does not offer national
"refresher" courses to reinforce or update officers' understanding of
the law.383 The operational culture of FOTs reflects little caution:
FOTs plan their operations using databases widely considered
inaccurate and outdated, increasing the risk that they will mistakenly
approach the wrong homes."* This is hardly the only area in which
the agency exhibits a "basic lack of care."385 As one example, Elias
cites the troubling increase in accidental deportations of United
States citizens as a pattern reflecting growing insensitivity to civil
rights. 6
At times, ICE has also created institutional incentives to
maximize arrests, incentives which may have had an especially
corrosive effect on civil rights. As the Migration Policy Institute
report shows, FOTs were initially designed to focus on individual
noncitizens who posed a danger to their communities.387 In 2004,
teams were given an arrest quota that "prioritized dangerousness,
stating that at least 75 percent of the individuals apprehended had to
379. See supra Part III.A.
380. Int'l Molders' & Allied Workers' Local Union v. Nelson, 799 F.2d 547, 551 (9th
Cir. 1986) (quoting INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210,218 n.6 (1984)).
381. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1044-45.
382. See Elias, supra note 12, at 1148 (citing Ward, supra note 176, at 44).
383. MIGRATION POLICY INST., supra note 11, at 23 (quoting OFFICE OF INSPECTOR
GEN., supra note 167, at 29-30).
384. See supra text accompanying notes 164-68.
385. Elias, supra note 12, at 1149 (quoting Ward, supra note 176, at 47).
386. See id. at 1148-49.
387. MIGRATION POLICY INST., supra note 11, at 1.
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be fugitive aliens with criminal convictions." "3 Two years later,
however, ICE increased this quota by seven hundred percent and
dropped the numerical emphasis on dangerous fugitives.' As a
result, teams were under enormous pressure to arrest ordinary status
violators; they began to arrest large numbers of noncitizens posing no
threat to the community.* ICE now reports that it has stopped using
arrest quotas to guide FOTs.39 1 It is yet unclear what effect the change
will have on the number of collateral arrests.
Remedies such as civil suits target "bad apples"-officers who
depart from institutional norms.3 * The violations common to FOT
raids, however, are widespread and uniform,393 reflecting the culture
and policies of the agency. 394 They require a restored judicial
safeguard. Lopez-Mendoza was premised on the Court's belief that
immigration officials had put in place adequate checks against abuse.
Those checks have failed; ICE agents nationwide act as if the warrant
requirement is a dead letter. As eight Justices suggested, Lopez-
Mendoza ought not survive such a dramatic deterioration in agency
conduct.395
IV. SUPPRESSING EVIDENCE FOR REGULATORY AND DUE PROCESS
VIOLATIONS DURING HOME RAIDS
Though home raids cut to the heart of the Fourth Amendment's
protection, they also implicate other rights that may, in turn, offer
advocates powerful alternative claims for evidentiary suppression.
ICE falls under a regulatory regime that mirrors and, in places, goes
beyond the protections the Constitution affords.3 96 Immigrants have
prevailed in some motions seeking evidentiary suppression for
388. Id. at 10 (citing OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 167, at 8).
389. Id. (citing N.C. Aizenman & Spencer S. Hsu, US Targeting Immigrant Absconders,
WASH. POST, May 5,2007, at Al).
390. Id. at 11.
391, See Anna Gorman, Immigration Official Says Agents Will No Longer Have
Quotas, L.A. Now (Aug. 17, 2009, 3:53 PM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2009/
08/immigration-official-said-agents-will-no-longer-have-quotas-.html.
392. See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 392-94 (1971)
(creating a civil remedy for Fourth Amendment violations by federal agents).
393. See CARDOZO IMMIGRATION JUSTICE CLINIC, supra note 11, at 16-17 (citing an
apparent pattern of misconduct).
394. See supra Part III.A.
395. See supra Part II.B.
396. See, e.g., 8 C.F.R. § 287.8(f)(2) (2010) (prohibiting officers from entering a
suspect's residence without a warrant or consent).
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violations of these regulatory rights; advocates often raise them
alongside constitutional claims.3*
Agencies must comply with their own regulations.398 Where an
agency's regulatory violations affect the rights of outsiders, federal
courts have sometimes demonstrated a willingness to intervene even
where the regulations provide no private right of action.399 The
immigration courts have done the same: in In re Garcia-Flores,4m the
BIA set out standards for the exclusion of evidence from removal
proceedings where immigration enforcement agents violated agency
regulations protecting the rights of noncitizens.4 0 1 In that case, the
respondent contended that agents obtained the evidence against her
through an unlawful interrogation in which they did not advise her of
her right to counsel.' Citing a regulation 403 that required basic rights
advisories for those in immigration custody, she called on the BIA to
suppress statements she made during the interrogation.'
The BIA formulated its rule in light of principles drawn from
past Supreme Court immigration cases.405 While it noted that courts
hold agencies to scrupulous observance of their own procedures, it
found that precedent did not require invalidation of proceedings or
397. See, e.g., In re Perez, No. A95-748-837, slip op. at 16 (L.A. Immigr. Ct. Feb. 10,
2009), available at http://www.aclu-sc.org/downloads/8/994425.pdf (suppressing evidence
obtained through an interrogation in violation of agency regulations); In re A- P-, slip op.
at 1 (B.I.A. July 22, 2010) (remanding for a suppression hearing in light of respondent's
Fourth Amendment, Due Process and regulatory claims) (on file with the North Carolina
Law Review).
398. See, e.g., Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 235 (1974) ("[W]here the rights of
individuals are affected, it is incumbent upon agencies to follow their own procedures ...
even where the internal procedures are possibly more rigorous than otherwise would be
required.").
399. See, e.g., United States v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 268 (1954) (vacating a
deportation order due to regulatory violations during proceedings); Montilla v. INS, 926
F.2d 162, 170 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that violations of the regulatory right to counsel in a
removal proceeding justified reversal and remand without requiring a showing of
prejudice).
400. 17 I. & N. Dec. 325 (B.I.A. 1980).
401. Id. at 328-29.
402. Id. at 326.
403. 8 C.F.R. § 287.3(c) (1977), amended by 62 Fed. Reg. 10312 (March 6, 1997). The
court noted that it was unclear whether the regulation required pre-interrogation
warnings; the regulation was later updated to reflect the government's view that no pre-
interrogation warnings were required. In re Garcia-Flores, 17 I. & N. Dec. at 327 n.3. The
regulation has since been further modified; for a discussion of the current provision, see
infra notes 430-33 and accompanying text.
404. In re Garcia-Flores, 17 I. & N. Dec. at 326.
405. See id. at 328 (citing Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 152-53 (1945), in which the
Supreme Court invalidated a deportation order entered after violations of the noncitizen's
regulatory rights).
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suppression of evidence following every regulatory violation.4 It
found the argument for suppression strongest where the agency
violated a regulation implementing protections that the Constitution
or federal law require.407 The BIA nevertheless recognized that
agencies are bound by their regulations even where those regulations
are more rigorous than the requirements of statutes or the
Constitution." The Board thus found suppression justified for a
violation if the regulation served some "purpose of benefit" to the
noncitizen, whether "procedural or substantive," and only if the
violation prejudiced an interest protected by the regulation.4 09 The
BIA suggested that the requisite prejudice was of a narrow kind: an
effect on the outcome of the proceeding.410 But it also called for
stronger protection where Constitutional rights are at stake: "[w]here
compliance with the regulation is mandated by the Constitution,
prejudice may be presumed," justifying suppression without a specific
demonstration of prejudice to the outcome.4 11
Many Homeland Security regulations serve to protect the rights
of noncitizens, thus satisfying the "purpose or benefit" prong of the In
re Garcia-Flores inquiry and justifying suppression for violations that
prejudice the outcome of subsequent removal proceedings.4 12 Several
such regulations parallel constitutional protections so closely as to
justify a presumption of prejudice.413 One regulation prohibits officers
from entering "a residence including the curtilage of such residence"
without a warrant or consent.414 Officers must record any entry by
406. Id. at 327.
407. Id. at 328; see Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 152 (1945) (invalidating a
deportation order based on evidence obtained in violation of regulations intended "to
afford [the alien] due process of law").
408. In re Garcia-Flores, 17 I. & N. Dec. at 328 (citing Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199,
235 (1974)).
409. Id. at 328-29 (citing United States v. Calderon-Medina, 591 F.2d 529, 531 (9th Cir.
1979)).
410. Id. at 328 (adopting the Ninth Circuit's "prejudice" test to determine whether a
violation harmed the noncitizen's interests "in such a way as to affect potentially the
outcome of their deportation proceeding" (citing United States v. Calderon-Medina, 591
F.2d 529, 532 (9th Cir. 1979))); id. at 329 ("We will accordingly remand ... to allow the
respondent the opportunity to demonstrate that the investigating officer's action
prejudiced her interests that were protected by the regulation and that such prejudice
affected the outcome of the deportation proceedings.").
411. Id. at 329. The Board found the regulation in question was not one justifying such
a presumption of prejudice, that is, the Constitution did not mandate compliance. Id.
412. Id. at 328-29; see, e.g., 8 C.F.R. § 287.8 (2010) (limiting the power of immigration
officers).
413. In re Garcia-Flores, 17 I. & N. Dec. at 329; see, e.g., § 287.8(f)(2).
414. § 287.8(f)(2). The provision also applies to businesses and farms, but it contains an
exception for certain searches near the border. 8 C.F.R. § 287(a)(3).
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consent, including, if possible, the identity of the person consenting.415
The Constitution clearly compels compliance with the regulatory
warrant requirement, which mirrors the Fourth Amendment
protection of the home.416 As such, an immigration judge must treat
nonconsensual, warrantless home invasions as creating a presumption
of prejudice that justifies suppression of any evidence obtained
thereby.417 In effect, this provision, along with the In re Garcia-Flores
rule,418 would justify suppression of evidence gathered in unlawful
entries without any inquiry into egregiousness.
Other regulations govern arrest and investigatory detentions. For
instance, one provides that noncitizens may be arrested only in light
of a "reasonable belief" that they are in violation of immigration
laws,4 19 a standard which courts have treated as equivalent to
probable cause. Investigatory stops must be "brief," and they
require reasonable suspicion.4 21 Again, these regulations track the
constitutional requirement almost precisely.42 2 Other provisions
require officers to identify themselves and to seek a warrant prior to
arrest unless they have a reason to believe the suspect may escape.423
Officers may only use force when they have "reasonable grounds to
believe that such force is necessary"; they must use the least degree of
force appropriate under the circumstances.424 This may be seen as
equivalent to the Fourth Amendment restriction on the use of force, a
standard of "objective reasonableness." 425
Finally, several regulations control interrogation and custody. As
a baseline, officers may not use "threats, coercion or physical abuse"
to obtain statements or waivers of rights. 426 The Due Process Clause
commands compliance with this provision427-indeed, the Due
Process Clause separately justifies the suppression of coerced
415. § 287.8(f)(2).
416. See supra Part II.A.1.
417. In re Garcia-Flores, 17 I. & N. Dec. at 328-29.
418. Id.
419. § 287.8(c).
420. See, e.g., United States v. Moya-Matute, 559 F. Supp. 2d 1189, 1210 (D.N.M. 2008)
(discussing § 287.8(c)(2) as an example of authority to arrest on probable cause).
421. § 287.8(b).
422. See supra Part II.A.4.
423. § 287.8(c) (requiring warrants unless the officer has "reason to believe that the
person is likely to escape," and requiring officers to identify themselves after arrest and
declare the reason for the arrest).
424. § 287.8(a).
425. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 399 (1989).
426. § 287.8(c)(2)(vii).
427. See Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 205-06 (1960) (barring the use of
coercion to obtain confessions).
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confessions. 428 DHS regulations also require that an officer arresting a
noncitizen without a warrant must advise her of her right to counsel
and inform her that her "statement[s] may be used against [her]."429
This provision, though, is susceptible to different interpretations. It
applies to a noncitizen "placed in formal proceedings. "430 In re
Garcia-Flores interpreted a predecessor provision as requiring rights
advisories at some point, not necessarily prior to interrogation. 431 A
''warning" after interrogation may be of little use to a detainee; as
such, at least one immigration judge has, in the absence of controlling
case law on the new regulation, interpreted it to require pre-
interrogation warnings.432
In either case, this protection is not an absolute constitutional
command under prevailing interpretations of the Due Process Clause.
While the due process prohibition of coercive interrogation certainly
applies to those detained by immigration authorities, the federal
judiciary has refused to extend Miranda-like protections outside of
the context of criminal proceedings.433 Still, should immigration
judges find that the regulation requires pre-interrogation warnings
after a warrantless arrest, the provision would be fertile ground for
suppression cases. Many home raids involve de facto arrests followed
by in-home interrogations producing admissions of alienage.434 In
428. See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1050-51 (1984) (O'Connor, J., plurality
opinion) (leaving open the possibility of suppression for violations of "fundamental
fairness" and citing a Due Process suppression case as an example, Rochin v. California,
342 U.S. 165 (1952)); Cuevas-Ortega v. INS, 588 F.2d 1274, 1277 (9th Cir. 1979)
("Deportation proceedings must conform to traditional standards of fairness encompassed
in due process; and accordingly, statements made by an alien used to support deportation
must be voluntarily made."); In re Toro, 17 I. & N. Dec. 340, 343 (B.I.A. 1980) (citing, as
an example of evidence suppressible on fundamental fairness grounds, involuntary
statements, as in Bong Youn Choy v. INS, 279 F.2d 642 (9th Cir. 1960)).
429. § 287.3(c). A different provision requires that officials give detained juveniles a
specific notice of rights, Form 1-770. 8 C.F.R. § 236.3(h) (2010). This provision is intended
to ensure that detained juveniles can contact adult relatives. See In re Maria E-E-M, A98-
428-903, slip op. at 2 (N.Y.C. Immigr. Ct. Sept. 6, 2007), available at http://bibdaily.com/
pdfs/E-E-M-%201J%20Romig%209-6-07.pdf. At least one immigration judge has
terminated a removal proceeding for noncompliance with this regulation. See id.
430. § 287.3(c).
431. In re Garcia-Flores, 17 I. & N. Dec. 325, 327 n.3 (B.I.A. 1980).
432. In re Perez, No. A95 748 837, slip op. at 15 (L.A. Immigr. Ct. Feb. 10, 2009),
available at http://www.aclu-sc.org/downloads/8/994425.pdf ("[B]ased on the language of
the regulation, the Court finds a reasonable interpretation to be that unless an alien is
subject to expedited removal . .. , any alien who is arrested without a warrant is entitled to
the requisite advisals prior to being interrogated.").
433. See Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1039 (citing cases holding that pre-interrogation
warnings are not required for those detained on suspicion of immigration violations).
434. See supra Part I.A.
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such a case, a failure to give warnings clearly harms the noncitizen's
right to remain silent and seek the advice of counsel; this may readily
prejudice the outcome of a proceeding in which the government's
burden is to prove alienage.435
Indeed, in many home raids, officers obtain prejudicial
statements (and occasionally physical evidence such as passports)
only through a series of regulatory violations-warrantless entry,
interrogation, searches-each of which may be a but-for cause of the
evidence of alienage and thus prejudicial to the rights of the
noncitizen.436 The government violates regulations when it enters a
home without consent or a warrant, when it rounds up residents
through threats and intimidation, when it uses unreasonable force
(for example drawing weapons or shoving) against compliant and
unarmed people suspected of no crime, and when it questions them in
an intimidating and coercive manner. 437 Homeland Security officials
are not above the law; they must be held to strict compliance with
their agency's regulations, particularly those implicating
constitutional rights. There are few rights more important or more
basic than the right to be left alone in one's home, the right to be free
from coercive interrogation, and the right to be free from arbitrary
detention. Under In re Garcia-Flores, noncitizens have strong claims
to safeguard those rights.
CONCLUSION
This Article aims to help advocates show that home raids rise
beyond mere illegality-that they often reflect egregious
constitutional violations. Its central approach to the question of
egregiousness, emphasizing the historical interpretation of the Fourth
Amendment, could be termed a legalistic one, rooted in
constitutional text and tradition; this is intended to supplement, not
replace, litigation strategies emphasizing the lived experiences of raid
victims. While this Article seeks to help readers convince a tribunal of
the offensiveness of a particular home invasion, I would like to close
with a few words about the significance of suppression cases and
Fugitive Operations in the evolving law of immigrant rights.
435. See, e.g., Murphy v. INS, 54 F.3d 605, 608-10 (9th Cir. 1995) (discussing the
government's burden of proof in removal proceedings).
436. See supra Part I.A. (citing examples of warrantless entries, searches, arrests and
interrogation).
437. See, e.g., supra notes 47-49.
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Suppression cases may not be cost-effective. They are pointless
in many instances, as where the government can produce independent
evidence of alienage.438 They are difficult to litigate, often prompting
hostility from immigration judges.439 Noncitizens who succeed in
suppressing evidence and terminating proceedings may nevertheless
be ineligible to obtain a lawful immigration status.440 Advocates must,
of course, help their clients come to an informed decision as to
whether a suppression motion is worth the effort, in relation to other
claims for relief.
Immigrant rights organizations must make their own conclusions
in assigning resources, and bottom-line cost effectiveness-the
number of clients they can help with the staff available-must be a
major criterion. It is not the only one, though. Home raid litigation
can vindicate the civil rights of immigrants in ways that reach beyond
the courtroom. Suppression cases and related litigation can expose
abuses otherwise ignored by the mainstream English-language
press." They can help bring oft-overlooked civil rights concerns to
the attention of the political branches.42
Home raids are lawless for a reason: the condition of "illegality"
pushes immigrants to the margins of American life, and presenting
home raids in constitutional terms can emphasize immigrants'
humanity. While the Warrant Clause enshrines a vision of privacy
rights rooted in a particular culture and a different era," the popular
and official response to home raids shows that those rights resonate
deeply today 4 -that they carry profound meaning for Americans
across the political spectrum.
438. See CARDOZO IMMIGRATION JUSTICE CLINIC, supra note 11, at 24-25; Baldini-
Potermin et al., supra note 24, at 423 (noting that motions to suppress would be ineffective
where the respondent had prior negative history before the immigration courts). But see In
re R-C- & J-C-, slip op. at 16-17 (N.Y.C. Immigr. Ct., May 12, 2010) (suppressing evidence
from one of respondent's prior immigration applications as "fruit of the poisonous tree,"
where agents had located the evidence only after egregious violations of respondent's
constitutional rights).
439. Baldini-Potermin et al., supra note 24, at 425.
440. Id. at 423.
441. See, e.g., Bernstein, supra note 53 (reporting an immigration judge's ruling that a
Staten Island home raid included egregious constitutional violations); Thomas
MacMillian, ICE Cases Melt Away, NEW HAVEN INDEP., June 8, 2009, http://newhaven
independent.orglarchives/ 2009/06/judge-iceviola.php.
442. See, e.g., supra note 14 (comments of public officials on civil rights violations in
home raids).
443. See supra Part II.B.3.b.
444. See supra note 14.
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